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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1987, Illinois repealed its murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes and replaced them with the new laws of first and second degree murder. Since that time, courts have been grappling
with the new laws, trying to adjust their thinking and reach a "just
result."
Central to this struggle has been the shift in the burden of
proving mitigation in order to reduce the degree of murder. Under
the old statute, the State carried the burden to prove all the elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including the mitigation necessary for a voluntary manslaughter conviction.' Under
1. However, it was the State that often argued the evidence was insufficient to warrant a voluntary manslaughter conviction, seeking instead to convict the defendant of murder. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text for
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the new first and second degree scheme, however, after the State
has proven all the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, one of the specified factors of mitigation in order to be
found guilty of second degree murder. This shift in the placement
of the burden of proof for the mitigation has radically changed the
state of homicide law in Illinois. It has also left much of the judiciary behind, still trying to apply old concepts to new law.
Any change in statutory law obviously requires judicial adjustment. The difficulty arising from the current statute brings to
mind the adage that "hard cases make bad law."2 There is no case
harder to try, for the accused, counsel or court, than a murder case.
Judges have a well-developed sense as to justice and fairness of results. However, faced with these new and rather unique 3 statutes,
judges appear to be searching for, and finding, varied approaches to
reach these outcomes. This has led to a few conflicting ideas. In
the process, many courts seem compelled to turn the statute upside
down, destroying its clear meaning and distorting its intent. On
the other hand, some courts have found a way to reach similar outcomes without torturing the statute or logic in the process.
Under the old statutes, a defendant whose voluntary manslaughter conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial
could not be retried for murder. Many judges considered voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. Therefore,
retrying the defendant for murder seemed to clearly violate double
jeopardy principles.
Many courts today simply paste these same notions onto the
new first and second degree murder statutes. These familiar concepts, however, do not apply. Second degree murder is not a lesser
included offense of first degree murder. As such, a court should
never even reach the double jeopardy analysis. One court found a
new way to characterize the relationship between first and second
degree murder, tagging second degree murder as a "lesser mitigated offense" 4 of first degree murder. This description works, and
works well.
Once properly understood to be a lesser mitigated offense of
first degree murder, courts can easily apply the second degree murder statute at trial and on appeal. At retrial, collateral estoppel
a discussion of the State's confused role under the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes in the Criminal Code of 1961.
2. E.g., Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 566
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3. The only other statute in Illinois which places the burden of proof on the
defendant at trial is the insanity provision. See 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e) (1992) (re-

quiring the defendat to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence).
4. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992).
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prevents a second degree murder defendant from facing a first degree murder conviction. Double jeopardy, familiar and reliable as it
may be, is unnecessary and indeed inappropriate. Nonetheless,
courts can reach the same desired goal within the bounds of the
law.
First, this Article briefly discusses Illinois' predecessor laws re5
garding what the State referred to as murder and manslaughter.
Second, the Article describes the new homicide law which shifts the
burden of proving mitigation to the defendant. Third, the Article
6
explores the various constitutional challenges to the new law.
Fourth, the Article discusses the doctrine of the lesser included offense, and it analyzes the doctrine's application in several different
cases. 7 Fifth, the Article briefly discusses the doctrines of implied
acquittal and double jeopardy.8 Sixth, the Article explores the doctrine of collateral estoppel and its application in a murder case. 9
5. In 1987, Illinois codified these homicides as first and second degree
murder. 1984 Ill. Laws 4221, PA 84-1450. See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of first and second degree murder statutes. Up to
that point, they were known as murder and voluntary manslaughter. See infra

notes 17-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Illinois' murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes before and after the adoption of the Criminal

Code of 1961. The similarities and differences between the various statutory
schemes are important in murder cases tried under the new statutes.

6. In particular the Article focuses on the Due Process Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause and the separation of powers doctrine. See infra notes 67-97
and accompanying text for a discussion of the due process challenges to the new
statutes. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Equal Protection challenges to the new statutes. See infra notes 128-151 and

accompanying text for a discussion of the separation of powers challenges to the
new statutes. Furthermore, this section addresses some of the interesting tangential issues. See, e.g., infra notes 132-151 and accompanying text addressing
whether the State can initially charge the defendant with second degree
murder.
7. See infra notes 171-205 and accompanying text. Some Illinois courts
find that second degree murder is a lesser included offense within first degree
murder. See infra notes 171-181 and accompanying text for a discussion of
decisions finding second degree murder to be lesser included in first degree
murder. Other Illinois courts vigorously reject this hypothesis. See infra notes
206-227 and accompanying text for a discussion of decisions rejecting the lesser
included offense analysis in the first and second degree murder context.
The Article analyzes the propriety of this lesser included offense doctrine
and concludes that second degree murder cannot be a lesser included offense of
first degree murder. See infra notes 206-227 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 229-239 and accompanying text. The Article explains
why these theories do not apply in the context of the first and second degree
murder statutes. See infra notes 240-245 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inapplicability of double jeopardy theory in the first and second degree murder context. The article highlights two Illinois Appellate Court cases
which misapply the lesser included offense and double jeopardy doctrines in the
first and second degree murder context. See infra notes 246-271 and accompanying text for a discussion of People v. Collins, 572 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1991), and People v. Godina, 584
N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 581 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 1992).
9. See infra notes 272-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
operation of collateral estoppel. As the Article makes clear, collateral estoppel
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Seventh, the Article examines the lesser mitigated offense characterization, and discusses how that nomenclature aptly applies to
the second degree murder statute.1" Eighth, the Article examines
whether the State may use collateral estoppel against a defendant.1 ' Ninth, the Article highlights two cases docketed before the
Illinois Supreme Court this term, and addresses their challenges to
one type of second degree murder and its interplay with self-defense. 1 2 The Article concludes that Illinois should follow the clear
intent in the murder statutes and classify second degree murder as
a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder instead of continuing the confusion surrounding the murder statutes.
II. THE

OLD LAWS

Since early statehood, Illinois divided "intentional homicide"
into two major types. For most of that time, the State classified an
intentional homicide as either murder or voluntary manslaughter. 13 Originally, the murder and voluntary manslaughter configurations depended on the presence or absence of malice
properly precludes a first degree murder conviction against a second degree
murder defendant facing a new trial.
10. See infra notes 309-332 and accompanying text for a discussion of sec-

ond degree murder as a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder.
11. See infra notes 333-335 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
potential application of collateral esteppel against a first degree murder defend-

ant. This issue would arise when a defendant, found guilty of first degree murder at his initial trial, is similarly remanded for a new trial. The question
becomes whether the State could estop the defendant from relitigating mitigation at the new trial.
12. See infra notes 336-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of a second degree murder case based on self-defense which leads to issues involving
the defandant's unreasonable belief.
13. Illinois gained statehood in 1818. ROBERT P. HOwARD, ILLINois: A HisTORY OF THE PRAIIE STATE 97 (1972). Soon thereafter, the state adopted its
homicide laws. See, e.g., 1827 Ill. Laws 127, § 22 (defining murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being... with malice aforethought, either express or
implied"); 1827 Ill. Laws 128, §§ 25, 26 (disregarding malice aforethought and
requiring "some actual assault upon the person killing, or an attempt by the
person killed, to commit a serious personal injury on the person killing"); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 358 (1959) (defining the elements of murder prior to the
adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 361, 362
(1959) (defining the elements of voluntary manslaughter prior to the adoption
of the Criminal Code of 1961).
Illinois has also categorized homicide as involuntary manslaughter and
reckless homicide, 720 ILCS 5/9-3 (1992), feticide, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
9-1.1 (1985) (repealed 1986), as well as the related offenses of concealment of a
homicidal death, 720 ILCS 5/9-3.1 (1992), and concealment of the death of a
bastard, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-4 (1985) (repealed 1988). Illinois replaced the feticide statute with the offenses of intentional homicide of an unborn child, 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2 (1992), voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child,
720 ILCS 5/9-2.1 (1992), and involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide
of an unborn child, 720 ILCS 5/9-3.2 (1992). In addition, the Legislature has
also recently added the crime of drug induced homicide. 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3
(1992).
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aforethought. 14 With the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961,
Illinois replaced the concept of malice aforethought with the requisite mental states of intent and knowledge. 15 In 1987, the Illinois
Legislature abandoned the murder/voluntary manslaughter
scheme in favor of the current first and second degree murder statutes; however, the basic elements of the two offenses have been retained from the 1961 codification. 16 This section addresses the
homicide laws prior to the Criminal Code of 1961. It then discusses
the interpretation of the Criminal Code of 1961 and the Code's importance to the current homicide laws in Illinois.
A.

Homicide Laws Prior to the Criminal Code of 1961

From the Middle Ages until comparatively recent times, murder was the sole homicide offense. 1 7 Prior to the adoption of the
14. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 358 (1959) (requiring malice
aforethought as an element of murder) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 361,

362 (1959) (requiring the absence of malice aforethought as an element in voluntary manslaughter cases). See infra note 23 and accompanying text for a
discussion of malice aforethought after the adoption of the Criminal Code of
1961.
15.

People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ill. 1986).

16. See People v. Clark, 565 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 918 (Ill. 1991) ("[T]he elements of first degree murder under
the current statute are identical to the offense of murder under the prior statute.... The mitigating factors of second degree murder are identical to the

factors which would have reduced murder to voluntary manslaughter under the
prior law."); see also 1986 Ill. Laws 4221, PA 84-1450 (demonstrating the
changes in the statutes). Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a) (1985)
(defining murder) with 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992) (defining first degree murder);
compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (1985) (defining voluntary manslaughter) with 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (1992) (defining second degree murder).
17. PETER W. LOW ET AL., CRIMnAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 779 (2d ed.
1986). By the sixteenth century, manslaughter had evolved into a lesser, noncapital homicide offense. Low, supra, at 779. As it matured, the dividing line
between murder and manslaughter became the concept of malice aforethought.
Id. at 780. According to one commentator during this period, murder exists
"when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being and under the king's peace, with malice aforethought,
either express or implied." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 195 (1854) (quoting Lord Coke). Blackstone defined manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of another, without malice either express or
implied .... " Id. The difference between the two crimes was "that manslaughter arises from the sudden heat of the passions, murder from the wickedness of
the heart." Id. at 190. In other words, manslaughter was defined as a homicide
committed without malice aforethought but which lacked justification or excuse. Low, supra, at 780.
Early English authorities held that once the prosecution proved the accused had committed the homicide, it was incumbent upon the defendant to
prove the mitigation to reduce the severity of the punishment. At common law,
therefore, the burden of proving the heat of passion for mitigation appeared to
rest on the defense. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 694 (1975). Early on,
Illinois adopted this principle statutorily. In a homicide trial, once the prosecution established an unlawful killing, "the burthen [sic] of proving circumstances
of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the homicide, [would] devolve on the accused .... ." 1827 Ill. Laws 130, § 40. See generally JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS
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Criminal Code of 1961, Illinois utilized a statutory scheme that cat-

egorized "intentional" homicide as either murder or voluntary
manslaughter.1 8
Illinois' prior homicide laws reflected the common law definition of murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being... with
malice aforethought, either express or implied." 19 In contrast to
murder, voluntary manslaughter was "the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice, express or implied, and without any
mixture of deliberation whatever."20 Thus, through 1961, Illinois
treated malice aforethought as an element of murder. 2 1 On the
other hand, voluntary manslaughter was essentially murder with22
out malice.
CRIMINAL LAw 187-88 (1986) (discussing the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes under the 1961 Criminal Code); Low, supra, at 779-81 (providing a
history of criminal homicide).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 358 (1959); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras.
361, 362 (1959)
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 358 (1959). The law implied malice "when
no considerable provocation appear[ed], or when all the circumstances of the
killing show[ed] an abandoned and malignant heart." Id.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 361 (1959). The statute demanded the killing be "upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible." Id. Illinois required the following for a
voluntary manslaughter conviction:
[T]here must be a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the
person killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable
person, or an attempt by the person killed to commit a serious personal
injury on the person killing. The killing must be the result of that sudden,
violent impulse of passion supposed to be irresistible; for if there should
appear to have been an interval between the assault or provocation given,
and the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard,
the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge, and punished as
murder.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 362 (1959).
21. See People v. Bush, 111 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ill. 1953) (finding no malice
where defendant slashed with knife at taunting crowd); People v. Jones, 51
N.E.2d 543, 545 (Ill. 1943) (holding that the defendant acted in the heat of passion, and without malice, at sight of husband with another woman); People v.
Papas, 44 N.E.2d 896, 898-99 (Ill. 1942) (holding that the defendant might not
have seen the deceased and therefore did not have the requisite malice); People
v. Brown, 123 N.E. 515, 516 (Ill. 1919) (seeing no malice aforethought in killing
while the defendant resisted an unlawful arrest); People v. Curtright, 101 N.E.
551, 555 (Ill. 1913) (holding that the court should imply malice aforethought
when a defendant displayed an "abandoned and malignant heart" in killing his
wife).
22. See People v. Harris, 134 N.E.2d 315, 317-18 (Ill. 1956) (holding that a
severe beating with a nightstick and fracturing defendant's jaw could constitute
sufficient provocation for reducing a charge to manslaughter); People v. Sain,
51 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ill. 1943) (finding that throwing hot water into defendant's
face and partially blinding him was a mitigating circumstance); People v. Rice,
184 N.E. 894, 896 (Ill. 1933) (finding that the jury properly found mitigation
when the deceased slapped the defendant's child and started a fight); People v.
Ortiz, 150 N.E. 708, 711 (Ill. 1926) (noting that verbal utterance was not sufficient provocation to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter); Davis v. People,
29 N.E. 192, 195-96 (Ill. 1885) (finding mitigation in a quarrel and prolonged
physical struggle).
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The Initial Homicide Statutes Under the Criminal Code of
1961 (1962-1987)

In 1961, Illinois' legislature reworked the homicide laws. First,
23
the legislature eliminated any reference to malice aforethought.
Instead, the statute recognized only four mental states: intent,
knowledge, recklessness and negligence. 2 4 Thus, the statute prescribed that an individual committed murder when he or she, either
25
intentionally or knowingly, unlawfully killed another person.
Second, the legislature altered the statute so that voluntary
manslaughter was not simply a killing without malice aforethought, but rather separated into two types. 26 Voluntary manslaughter could be (1) a killing "under sudden and intense passion,"
or (2) a killing which the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed was justified as self-defense.2 7 Therefore, with the elimina23. People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ill. 1986); Taylor v. Gilmore, 954
F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The question, then, is whether malice was an
element of murder in Illinois at the time of Taylor's conviction."), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993); see also S. 522, 83d Ill. Gen. Ass'y 38
(May 23, 1985) (quoting Senator Sangmiester: "[T]his all comes about because
of... [sic] back in 1961 when we revised the Criminal Code... there is no more
reference to malice of forethought [sic], and with that being gone, therein rises
the confusion"). Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 358 (1959) (requiring
malice aforethought in a murder case) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a)
(1985) (excluding malice from consideration); compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
paras. 361, 362 (1959) (including the absence of malice in the voluntary manslaughter definition) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (1985) (excluding any
reference to malice in the voluntary manslaughter definition).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 4-3 to 4-7 (1985).
25.

ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 38, para. 9-1 (a) (1985). In Illinois:

A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
murder, if in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual
or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual
or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary manslaughter.
Id.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (1985).
27. Id. The statute states in part:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a
sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:
(1) The individual killed, or
(2) Another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or
accidentally causes the death of the individual killed.
Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits
voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 [self-defense] of this Code, but
his belief is unreasonable.
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tion of malice aforethought from the language of the statutes,
Illinois converted voluntary manslaughter from "murder minus
malice aforethought" to "murder plus mitigating circumstances." 28
The resulting confusion motivated Justice Blackmun to write: "The
relation between murder and voluntary manslaughter in Illinois...
29
was a complicated one."

Under the murder/voluntary manslaughter dichotomy, the
30
State carried the burden of proving all the elements of murder. If
the defendant introduced evidence of mitigation, the State technically bore the burden of proving the mitigation necessary to reduce
the conviction from murder to voluntary manslaughter. 3 ' Yet, despite the fact that the State carried the burden of proof, it was the
defendant who wished to establish the mitigation. "[Iun cases in
which the jury was instructed on both murder and voluntary manslaughter, it was often the prosecutor who argued the evidence
failed to show the presence of [mitigating circumstances], while the
32
defendant argued one or both [was] present."
33
Indeed, the then-existing Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions
mandated that the State must prove the mitigation for voluntary
manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. The State had to estabId.
28. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating: "Illinois
homicide law provided that murder had two elements .... Voluntary manslaughter had three elements. The first two were, for all relevant purposes, the
same as both elements of murder. The third was a mitigating [factor] ..
rev'd on other grounds sub. non. 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
29. Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2125 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
30. People v. Reddick, 526 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Ill. 1988).
31. People v. Brown, 578 N.E.2d 1168, 1172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that
under the voluntary manslaughter statute "an unreasonable belief in self-defense had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the State"), appeal denied,
591 N.E.2d 25 (Ill. 1992); see also DECKER, supra note 17, at 19 (Supp. 1990)
(stating that the voluntary manslaughter statute "was criticized on grounds
that it required the state to prove murder plus mitigation in order to convict")
(emphasis in original).
32. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992); see also S. 522, 84th Ill. Gen. Ass'y 71 (June
23, 1986) (containing the remarks of Representative Homer: "[Tihe state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense [of
voluntary manslaughter], including the mitigating circumstances, which, in
many cases, the state does not wish to prove."); id. at 72 (quoting Representative Cullerton: "[N]ormally, the defendant is the one who wishes to bring to the
attention of the jury or a Judge [sic] those extenuating circumstances, but the
way the law works now is that the... [sic] the state has the burden of proving
this .... ").
33. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter I.P.I.--CRIMINAL (1981)]. If applicable, the judge must use these instructions. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 451(a) (1991);
People v. Bosek, 569 N.E.2d 551,567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that "a non-IPI
instruction should be used only if a pattern instruction does not contain an accurate instruction on the subject upon which the jury should be instructed"),
appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 121 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1180 (1992).
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lish the "sudden and intense passion" to obtain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter involving provocation. 34 If it was a case of
voluntary manslaughter involving unreasonable belief, the State
needed to prove that although the defendant had a subjective belief
in self-defense, the belief was unreasonable.3 5 However, the prosecution could prove murder without actually disproving subjective
belief.36 This anomalous result did not go unnoticed. 3 7 It was in
34. I.P.I.-CPiMnNAL (1981), supra note 33, No. 7.04 at 62. The instruction
provided:
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove
the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death
of _
; and
Second: That when the defendant did so, (1) he intended to kill or do
great bodily harm to _
; or (2) he knew that such acts would cause
death or great bodily harm to _
; or (3) he knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to _
; and
Third: That when the defendant did so, (1) he acted under a sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by another; or (2) he
acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by some other person he endeavored to kill, but he negligently or accidentally killed _
.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of
these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of
these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant not guilty.
Id.
35. I.P.I.-CiMINAL (1981), supra note 33, No. 7.06 at 65. The instruction
provided:
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove
the following propositions:
First:That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of
__,;
and
Second: That when the defendant did so, (1) he intended to kill or do
great bodily harm to _
; or (2) he knew that such acts would cause
death or great bodily harm to __
; or (3) he knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to _
; and
Third: That when the defendant did so he believed that circumstances
existed which would have justified killing _
; and
Fourth: That the defendant's belief that such circumstances existed
was unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of
these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of
these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant not guilty.
Id.
36. I.P.I.-CRMINAL (1981), supra note 33, Nos. 7.02, 24-25.06A. No. 7.02
provided:
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First:That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of
__;
and
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this context that the Illinois legislature, through PA 84-1450, elimiand created the crimes
nated murder and voluntary manslaughter
38
of first and second degree murder.
Some practitioners argue that under the original 1961 Code,
voluntary manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of murder.3 9 Illinois defines a lesser included offense as an offense "established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less
culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to esSecond: That when the defendant did so, (1) he intended to kill or do
; or (2) he knew that such acts would cause
great bodily harm to _
; or (3) he knew that such acts credeath or great bodily harm to _
; and
ated a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to _
Third: That the defendant was not justified in using the force which he
used.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of
these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of
these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant not guilty.
Id.
37. See, e.g., Timothy P. O'Neill, "MurderLeast Foul": A Proposalto Abolish
Voluntary Manslaughterin Illinois, 72 ILL. B.J. 306, 307 (1984) (discussing the
mitigating circumstances within a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction
versus a murder instruction); James B. Haddad, Allocation of Burdens in Murder-Voluntary ManslaughterCases:An Affirmative Defense Approach, 59 CHLKENT L. REV. 23, 31-35 (1982) (discussing the mitigating circumstances mentioned in the jury instructions); Timothy P. O'Neill, "With Malice Toward
None": A Solution to an Illinois Homicide Quandary, 32 DEPAUL L. REv. 107,
112-13 (1982); see also, e.g., S. 522, 84th Ill. Gen. Ass'y 71 (June 23, 1986) (noting Rep. Homer's comment that members proposed PA 84-1450 to "avoid the
anomaly that's found in the current statutes").
38. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992). "[Tlhe legislative intent in the enactment of
the second degree murder statute was clearly to eliminate the confusion and
problems of the old law. . . ." Id. at 592.
39. Timothy P. O'Neill, An Analysis of Illinois' New Offense of Second Degree Murder, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 214 (1986). Professor O'Neill also
notes, however, that some Illinois courts have disagreed. Id. at 214, n.40 (citing
People v. Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d 335 (1985)). However, the Illinois Supreme Court
has since rejected the notion of the inconsistent mental states discussed in
Hoffer. People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ill. 1986). In Wright, a unanimous Court found that murder and voluntary manslaughter statutorily required proof of the same mental state. Id. The Court said voluntary
manslaughter required proof of the additional element of mitigation. Id.; see
Robert J. Steigmann, First and Second Degree Murder in Illinois, 75 ILL. BAR.
J. 494, 495-96 (1987). Nonetheless, some courts maintained voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of murder. E.g., People v. Thomas, 576
N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1991).
Other courts have taken the opposite view. E.g., United States ex rel. Fleming
v. Gramley, 735 F. Supp. 302, 308 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (citing People v. Shumpert,
533 N.E.2d 1106 (Ill. 1989), and finding that voluntary manslaughter was not a
lesser included offense of murder), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. United
States ex rel. Fleming v. Huch, 924 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991).
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tablish the commission of the offense charged . .. "40 Professor
Timothy P. O'Neill argues voluntary manslaughter could not have
been a lesser included offense under the "elements" test because it
required more elements than murder. 4 1 Voluntary manslaughter
was murder plus either of the mitigating factors. 42 To be a lesser
offense included under this test, voluntary manslaughter should
have required fewer elements of murder, not more. Illinois law recognizes only the four mental states specified in the Criminal Code:
intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. 43 Voluntary manslaughter did not have a less culpable mental state than murder
because proof of each crime required a showing of either intent or
knowledge. 44 However, rather than classifying voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, some argue voluntary manslaughter was more properly "a less culpable kind of
murder-'murder with mitigating circumstances'" thereby deserving a lesser penalty. 4 5 Eventually, the legislature responded to the
problems created by the 1961 statutes and changed Illinois murder
laws.
III.

ILLINOIS LAw UNDER THE NEW STATUTES: THE

1987

AMENDMENTS

In 1986, Illinois' General Assembly amended the homicide statutes.46 Effective July 1, 1987, Illinois eliminated voluntary man40. 720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (1992). These tests are known as the "elements" test

and the "mental state" test.
41.
42.
43.

O'Neill, supra note 38, at 214.
Id.
720 ILCS 5/4-3 5/4-7 (1992); see ONiell, supra note 38 at 214 (discuss-

ing the requisite states of mind).
44. See O'Niell, supranote 38, at 214 (stating that "voluntary manslaughter

involved an unjustified homicide performed intentionally or knowingly"). Also
see supra notes 25-27 setting forth the text of the murder and voluntary man-

slaughter statutes under the Criminal Code of 1961.
45. O'Neill, supra note 38, at 214.
46. 1986 Ill. Laws 4221, PA 84-1450. The Illinois first degree murder statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual
or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or
another; or
(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second
degree murder.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992).
Illinois' second degree murder statute states:
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he
commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraphs (1) or
(2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of the following
mitigating factors are present:
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slaughter and replaced it with second degree murder. 4 7 While
retaining all the substantive language of the old murder statute by
merely renaming it "first degree murder" 48 , the new legislation discarded those provisions regarding voluntary manslaughter and re49
placed them with the new law of second degree murder.
The new crime of second degree murder retains the elements of
mitigation used in the two types of voluntary manslaughter: provo(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or an-

other whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or

(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such
that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles states in Article 7 [self-defense] of this Code, but his belief is
unreasonable.
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
(c) When a defendant is on trial for first degree murder and evidence
of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section
has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant

can be found guilty of second degree murder. However, the burden of proof

remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the absence
of circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate
the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. In a jury
trial for first degree murder in which evidence of either of the mitigating
factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented and defendant has requested that the jury be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the jury must be instructed that it
may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proof with
regard to second degree murder until and unless it has first determined
that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements
of first degree murder.
(d) Sentence. Second Degree Murder is a Class 1 felony.
720 ILCS 5/9-2 (1992).
47. People v. Cook, 576 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584
N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1991); see also S. 522, 84th Ill. Gen. Ass'y 71 (June 23, 1986)
(noting Rep. Homer's comment: "This Bill... creates [the] new offenses of first
and second degree murder .... [I]nstead of voluntary manslaughter, this Bill
suggests that we have a second degree murder. .. ").
48. People v. Deason, 584 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("The only
change in section 9-1 of the Code brought about by Public Act 84-1450 was the
title of the offense-changing it from 'murder' to 'first degree murder.' Substantively, the offense of murder was defined no differently than is the offense of
first degree murder."); see also S. 522, 84th Ill. Gen. Ass'y 71 (June 23, 1986)
(noting the remark by Rep. Homer that "'[Tihe elements required for murder'
... would be the identical elements that would be in the proposed first degree
murder [statute] . . . ."); Steigmann, supra note 39, at 494-95 (explaining the
elements of murder before and after the 1987 revision). Compare 720 ILCS 5/91(a) (1992) (setting forth the elements of first degree murder) with ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38., para. 9-1 (a) (1985) (defining the elements of murder prior to PA
84-1450).
49. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992); Steigmann, supra note 39, at 494.
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cation and unreasonable belief.50 However, it clearly places the
burden of proving the requisite mitigation on the defendant. 5 ' In a
murder trial, the prosecution must establish all the elements of
first degree murder 52 beyond a reasonable doubt 53 before the jury
can consider the mitigation issue. 54 In other words, the prosecution
must satisfy its burden first. If it fails to do so, the court should
acquit the defendant. 5
Once the jury determines the State has proven the elements of
first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, it can then consider
the mitigation issue to determine which degree of murder is appli50. People v. Clark, 656 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("The mitigating
factors of second degree murder are identical to the factors which would have
reduced murder to voluntary manslaughter under the prior law"), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 918 (Ill. 1991). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the two types of voluntary manslaughter under the 1961
Criminal Code.
51. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992); see People v. Shumpert, 533 N.E.2d 1106,
1109 (Ill. 1989) ('[Tlhe defendant now bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, one of the factors in mitigation .... "); see also S. 522,
84th Ill. Gen. Ass'y 72 (June 23, 1986) (quoting Rep. Cullerton: "And what we're
doing, however, is not to change the elements of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, but we're basically changing the burden of proof to the defendant");
Id. at 71 (noting the comment by Rep. Homer: "[Tihe defendant, and not the
state, would bear the burden of proving the mitigating circumstance").
Illinois' Pattern Jury Instructions state:
If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
of first degree murder, the defendant then has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor is present so that he
is guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder.
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--

CRIMINAL, No. 2.03A (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter I.P.I.-CRIMINAL (1992)].
This shift is not new to Illinois jurisprudence, however. As far back as the
early nineteenth century the defendant had the burden of proving mitigation in
a homicide case. E.g., 1827 Ill. Laws 130, § 40.
52. The elements are: (1) death; (2) causation; and (3) intent or knowledge.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992).
53. The State must always prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
54. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a), 5/9-2(c) (1992); see People v. Brown, 578 N.E.2d 1168,
1172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (requiring the State to satisfy the elements of first
degree murder before giving the defendant an opportunity to admit evidence of
mitigating circumstances), appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 25 (Ill. 1992); People v.
Hrobowski, 575 N.E.2d 1306, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct.) (noting that the defendant can
prove up his mitigating circumstances after the State makes its case for first
degree murder), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. 1991).
55. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992); see People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 598
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("[Ihf the evidence is insufficient to prove the elements of
first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, no murder conviction of any
kind can be permitted.") (emphasis in original), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022
(Ill. 1992).
Illinois' Pattern Jury Instructions provide: "You may not consider whether
the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder until and
unless you have first determined that the State has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the previously stated propositions." I.P.I.-CRIMINAL (1992),
supra note 51, Nos. 7.04A & 7.06A.
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cable. 5 6 To succeed in reducing first degree murder to second degree murder, the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence,5 7 either of the following two mitigating factors: (1) he or
she had an unreasonable belief in self-defense; 58 or (2) he or she
was acting under sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation.5 9 Thus, second degree murder mimics its prede56. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992); People v. Jerome, 564 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. 1991); cf People v. Bosek,
569 N.E.2d 551, 565 (Ill. App. Ct.) ("In order for the jury to reach the issue of
whether the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, it must already have
found him guilty of first degree murder beyond reasonable doubt.") (emphasis
added), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 121 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1180
(1992).
Illinois' Pattern Jury Instructions require the judge to instruct the jury:
If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
of first degree murder, the defendant then has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor is present so that he
is guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder.
I.P.I.-CRMINAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 2.03A.
57. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992).
The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions provide: "The phrase 'preponderance
of the evidence' means whether, considering all the evidence in the case, the
proposition on which the defendant has the burden of proof is probably more
true than not true." I.P.I.-CRIMINAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 4.18.
58. People v. Johnson, 592 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (requiring a
belief "that force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm, even
though that belief was unreasonable"); see, e.g., People v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806,
809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (denying claim of shock and fear of family disgrace as a
basis for a mother's claim that she unreasonably believed killing her secretlyborn baby was justifiable; mother was not acting in self-defense); Jerome, 564
N.E.2d at 224 (holding the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on
second degree murder based on an unreasonable belief in self-defense because
the defendant's claimed fear of falling down stairs due to the victim's pushing
him did not support a finding that defendant unreasonably believed his resort
to using a knife was necessary).
The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions provide:
A mitigating factor exists so as to reduce the offense of first degree murder
to the lesser offense of second degree murder if at the time of the killing the
defendant believes that circumstances exist which would justify the deadly
force he uses, but his belief that such circumstances exist is unreasonable.
I.P.I.-CRIMINAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 7.05A.
59. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a), 9-2(c) (1992). The statute defines serious provocation
as "conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person." 720
ILCS 5/9-2(b) (1992).
Illinois' Pattern Jury Instructions require the judge to tell the jury: "A mitigating factor exists so as to reduce the offense of first degree murder to the
lesser offense of second degree murder if, at the time of the killing, the defendant acts under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
.. I.P.I.-CRIMINAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 7.03A.
Illinois recognizes only four categories of provocation as sufficiently exciting to reduce a homicide to second degree murder: (1) substantial physical injury or assault; (2) mutual quarrel or combat; (3) illegal arrest; and (4) adultery
with the offender's spouse. People v. Tenner, No. 6998, 1993 WL 421591, at *12
(Ill. Oct. 21, 1993); People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ill. 1989); People
v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d
806, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). However, words alone are insufficient provocation
"no matter how aggravated, abusive, opprobrious or indecent the language."
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cessor's formulation of mitigation factors.
Other theories of mitigation are not sufficient to reduce the potential conviction from first to second degree murder.60 Furthermore, there must be some evidence to warrant a second degree
murder instruction to the jury. 6 1 Either the prosecution or the deChevalier, 544 N.E.2d at 944; accord Freddo v. State, 155 S.W. 170, 172 (Tenn.
1913) (stating the Tennessee common law that "the law regards no mere epithet
or language, however violent or offensive, as sufficient provocation for taking
life"). Similarly, mere trespass is insufficient provocation. Tenner, 1993 WL
421591, at *12. Also, a young child cannot cause the serious provocation required. People v. Crews, 231 N.E.2d 451, 453 (Ill. 1967). The same is true of an
infant. Doss, 574 N.E.2d at 809.
However, modem Illinois statutory law explicitly prohibits a person from
resisting arrest, whether lawful or unlawful. 720 ILCS 5/7-7 (1992). But cf
People v. Brown, 123 N.E. 515, 516 (Ill. 1919) (finding that killing a police officer while resisting an unlawful arrest could constitute sufficient provocation
and citing Rafferty v. People, 69 Ill. 111 (1873), for the same proposition). As
such, the passionate value of a killing provoked by an illegal arrest may no
longer be sufficient. See DECKER, supra note 17, at 214 (writing that "[blecause
of the state legislature's posture on this subject, it is doubtful that the Illinois
courts would be receptive to the adequate-provocation argument if an arrestee
took an officer's life"). To succeed on a claim of provocation due to adulterous
behavior, the defendant must discover the parties immediately before, during
or after the adulterous act, and the killing must immediately follow the discovery. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d at 944. Simply hearing about it, even a confession
by the spouse, is insufficient. Id.; see People v. Jones, 51 N.E.2d 543, 545-46 (Ill.
1943) (holding that the defendant acted in the heat of passion at the sight of her
husband with another woman). But see Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 417
N.E.2d 1213, 1215 (Mass. 1981) (holding that a sudden admission of adultery is
equivalent to a discovery of the act itself, and is sufficient evidence of

provocation).
Mutual combat exists where the parties willingly enter into combat upon
equal terms in the heat of passion. People v. Johnson, 575 N.E.2d 1247, 1256
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991). However, courts will not find provocation when the defendant instigated the fight. People v. Banks, 592 N.E.2d 107, 116 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992). Also, the defendant's reaction must be to conduct "serious enough to
unleash an intense passion in a reasonable person". People v. Smalley, No. 1-

89-0950, 1991 WL 274553 at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (unpublished opinion).

Slight provocation will not suffice to reduce the crime from a charge of firstdegree murder. Id. Finally, when provocation results from physical injury, the
assault must have been sufficiently substantial. Compare People v. Stowers,

273 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (holding that the deceased hitting the
defendant on the head with a beer can constituted serious provocation) with
People v. Simpson, 384 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ill. 1978) (finding no serious provoca-

tion when the deceased scratched the defendant).
60. See, e.g., People v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (hold-

ing that the defense of compulsion is unavailable to accused charged with first
degree murder).
61. People v. Vargas, 587 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding no
evidence in the record on which to base an instruction on second degree murder); Doss, 574 N.E.2d at 809-10 (finding no evidence of a mitigating factor and

holding that it was legally impossible for the defendant to commit second degree murder); People v. Jerome, 564 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal
denied, 571 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. 1991) (noting that "[e]ven a slight amount of evidence will raise the issues and justify an instruction," but cautioning that a
court may refuse a second degree murder instruction when the evidence does
not support the defense), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. 1992).
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fense may provide the mitigation evidence. 62 Before convicting an
individual of second degree murder, the jury must find that either
statutorily specified mitigating factor exists by a preponderance of
the evidence. If the jury does not find enough evidence of mitigating circumstances, it must convict the defendant for first degree
murder.6 3 These legislative changes resulted in numerous challenges to the new second degree murder statute.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW STATUTE:
CHALLENGES AND DEFENSES

Foremost among the statutory changes was the transfer of the
burden of establishing mitigation. Under the 1961 provisions, the
State realistically had to disprove the existence of mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. 64 The new legislation, however, shifts the
burden to the defense and requires it to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence one of the specified mitigating factors. Since the
change, murder defendants have launched an assault on the constitutionality of the shift in the burden of proof.6 5 Courts and scholars, however, have uniformly rejected these challenges. 66
62.

While the defendant carries the burden of proof regarding the establish-

ment of mitigation to reduce the crime to second degree murder, the trier of fact
can consider any evidence introduced at trial, by either the defense or prosecution. People v. Golden, 614 N.E.2d 444, 450 (II. App. Ct. 1993).
The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions provide: "In deciding whether a mitigating factor is present, you should consider all of the evidence bearing on this
question". I.P.I.-CRiniNAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 2.03A. Indeed, the defendant need not introduce any evidence supporting a claim of mitigation,
although clearly it would be in his best interests to do so. O'Neill, supra note
39, at 222. In fact, the judge should instruct the jury that the defendant need
not present any evidence of mitigating factors if such evidence appeared during
the prosecution's case. I.P.I.-CRIMNAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 2.03A, Committee Note.
63. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992); People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 598 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992). But see People v.
Collins, 572 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that while the evidence
was insufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder, the evidence
was sufficient for a second degree murder conviction), appeal denied, 580
N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1991). See infra notes 263-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Collins and its poor authority.
64. People v. Reddick, 526 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Ill. 1988) (discussing the 1961
law and holding, under that provision, that if a defendant raises some evidence
of mitigation the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt). See
supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the murder and
voluntary manslaughter statutes under the 1961 Criminal Code.
65. One writer has also hinted at a challenge based on Illinois' proportionality requirement. See Larry R. Wells, Presumed Guilty: Curingthe Defects in the
Second Degree Murder Statute, 80 ILL. B.J. 230, 232 (1992). However, while

criminal sanctions must be proportional to the crime, the "legislature has wide
discretion in prescribing penalties for defined criminal offenses." People v.
Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Ill. 1992). No court has accepted the proportionality

argument.

66. See People v. Johnson, 592 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (affirming the constitutionality of the Illinois murder statute) (citations omitted);
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This section addresses the various challenges to the new statute. First, it analyzes the due process arguments raised by defendants. Second, this section discusses the unsuccessful challenges
made by defendants based on the equal protection. Third, this section addresses the statute in the context of the doctrine of separation of powers and considers whether the State can initially charge
a defendant with second degree murder.
A.

Due Process Challenges

Defendants routinely challenge the shift of the mitigation bur67
den by classifying it as a violation of the Due Process Clause.
While it is unconstitutional for a State to require a defendant to
disprove an element of the crime charged, 68 the new statute does
not require this.6 9 Instead, it merely shifts to the defendant the
burden of establishing sufficient mitigation that will reduce the already proven charge of first degree murder. 70 Thus, there is no
overlap between any element that the7 1 prosecution must prove and
the facts the defense must establish.
72
The United States Supreme Court, in Pattersonv. New York,
People v. Banks, 592 N.E.2d 107, 114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (rejecting a defend-

ant's challenges to Illinois' first degree murder statute based on due process,

equal protection and separation of powers grounds) (citations omitted); see also
O'Neill, supra note 39, at 221-22 (discussing the constitutionality of the homicide laws); Steigmann, supra note 39, at 497. But see Wells, supra note 65, at
230.
67. E.g., People v. Horton, 598 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); People
v. Brown, 578 N.E.2d 1168, 1172-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 591
N.E.2d 25 (Ill. 1992); People v. Cook, 576 N.E.2d 1242, 1243 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 133 (111. 1991); People v. Hrobowski, 575 N.E.2d 1306,
1320 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. 1991); People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022
(Ill. 1992).
68. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510, 527 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
69. See Brown, 578 N.E.2d at 1172 (approving of the statute since it does
not force the defendant to negate any elements of first degree murder and noting that the defendant confused self-defense with second degree murder's mitigating factors); Cook, 576 N.E.2d at 1245 (declaring the statute constitutional
because it does not require the defendant to prove any element of first degree
murder).
70. In Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 231, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987)
the United States Supreme Court held the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state to require the defendant to prove self-defense. Under Martin, the less-burdensome Illinois scheme merely concerning
grades of murder should clearly be constitutional. Cf Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit a
State from requiring the defendant to prove an affirmative defense or mitigation in order to reduce the degree of a homicide charge).
71. See Cook, 576 N.E.2d at 1245 (holding, specifically, that since "[tihe
existence of provocation or an unreasonable belief in justification ... will not
diminish or negate any of the proved elements of first degree murder[,] [tihe
mitigating factor is a separate issue . . . ."); O'Neill, supra note 39, at 221.
72. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not forbid a State from requiring a defendant to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the mitigation necessary to reduce
the severity of a homicide charge. 73 At issue in Patterson was a
New York statute requiring a defendant charged with second degree murder to prove by a preponderance of the evidence an affirmative defense of emotional disturbance in order to reduce the
homicide to manslaughter. 74 The Supreme Court found that the
"prosecution was required to prove all the elements of the crime
charged," but the burden then could shift to the defendant to prove
75
the affirmative defense.
Defendants argue that rather than Patterson, the United
States Supreme Court decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur 76 should control. 77 In Mullaney, the Supreme Court struck down Maine's homicide statute which defined murder as the unlawful killing of a
73. Id. at 201.
74. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201; People v. Gore, 571 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. 1991).

The New York law provided in relevant part:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:

(2) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not
constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision one of section
125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reduc-

ing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in
any prosecution initiated under this subdivision.

N.Y.

PENAL LAW

§ 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975).

New York's crime of "second degree murder" was not identical to Illinois'
version of the homicide bearing that name. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9-1, 9-2 (1992)
(setting forth the elements of second degree murder in Illinois) with N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975) (setting forth the elements of second degree
murder in New York). These schemes are also similar to Montana's "mitigated
deliberate homicide," which requires proof by the defendant of mental or emotional stress to reduce the crime from deliberate homicide. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-103 (1991). See infra notes 319-325 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Montana statute.
75. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201. The Supreme Court, citing Patterson, recently reaffirmed that principle in another context, stating: "So long as a State's
method of allocating the burdens of proof does not lessen the State's burden to
prove every element of the offense charged . . . a defendant's constitutional
rights are not violated by placing on him the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 650 (1990) (discussing the defendant's burden to prove mitigation to
avoid the death penalty); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 288 (1987) (finding
that Due Process does not prohibit a State from placing on the defendant the
burden of proving self-defense). Illinois courts follow this reasonaing as well.
Gore, 571 N.E.2d at 1046.
76. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
77. E.g., Defendant's Brief at 29, People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (No. 4-90-0568).
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human being with malice aforethought. 78 However, the Maine
statute implied malice aforethought unless the defendant proved
the killing occurred in the heat of passion. 79 If the defendant
proved the passion, the conviction would be for the reduced charge
of voluntary manslaughter.8 0 The Supreme Court, like the trial
court, "emphasized that 'malice aforethought and heat of passion on
sudden provocation are two inconsistent things.'"81 Thus, Maine
defined voluntary manslaughter as murder minus malice, with the
burden to prove the absence of malice resting upon the defendant.
Therefore, the defendant had the burden to prove or negate an element of the offense. The Supreme Court held this practice to be
violative of due process.8 2 As malice aforethought was an element
of murder, and as the statute required the defendant to prove its
absence for a voluntary manslaughter conviction, the Maine statute
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
Defendants premise their arguments on the belief that Illinois'
first and second degree murder statutes require different mental
states.8 3 They argue that the mental state required by the first
degree murder statute is really malice aforethought, and that proving the mitigation for second degree murder is tantamount to proving the absence of malice. 8 4 These defendants regularly rely upon
Mullaney. This, of course, was the formula for murder and voluntary manslaughter both at common law and under Illinois' statutes
prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961.8 5 Despite the
change in the statutory language, defendants argue that malice
aforethought is still the underlying mental state for first degree
murder. Since second degree murder would be first degree murder
without malice, the defendant would be negating an element of the
offense. 8 6 Illinois courts distinguish Mullaney, noting that the second degree murder statute does not require the defendant to negate
78. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04.
79. Id. at 686.
80. Id. at 686-87.
81. Id. (quoting from the trial transcript).
82. Id. at 704.
83. E.g., Defendant's Brief at 29, People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (No. 4-90-0568); Defendant's Brief at 11, People v. Timberson,
573 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (No. 5-90-0482).
84. See, e.g., Defendant's Brief at 35, People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (No. 4-90-0568) ("[I]t necessarily follows that if first degree
murder is a killing with malice aforethought [and] ... second degree murder is
a killing without malice aforethought.. . ."); cf Defendant's Brief at 17, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (No. 75-1861) ("On their face, the defense
invalidated in Mullaney and the challenged New York defense are functionally
identical.").
85. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
elements of murder and voluntary manslaughter prior to the adoption of the
Criminal Code of 1961.
86. Defendant's Brief at 35, People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (No. 4-90-0568).
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any element of first degree murder.8 7 Instead, Illinois courts rely
upon Patterson and its progeny.8 8 In finding the Illinois scheme
more reflective of Pattersonthan Mullaney, courts hold that the defendant's burden to establish mitigation constitutes a partial defense to, rather than a negation of, an element of first degree
murder.8 9 This distinction arises from the conclusion that the
mental states required by the two statutes are not inconsistent.
With the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961, Illinois rejected
malice aforethought as a mental state. 90 In 1986, the Illinois
Supreme Court found no inconsistency between the mental states of
the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes. 9 1 Thus, Illinois
courts reject defense attempts to analogize the Illinois scheme with
the problems identified in Mullaney. Instead they noted the similarity to the approved system in Patterson.
Typical of due process challenges are defense arguments that
the second degree murder statute "is unconstitutional in that it impermissibly places the burden of proof upon the defendant to prove
mitigating factors sufficient to reduce first degree murder to second
degree murder." 92 Defendants argued this due process challenge in
People v. Cook 93 and People v. Hrobowski.9 4 Both courts began
87.

See, e.g., People v. Cook, 576 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct.) (finding

no infirmity in the murder statute), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 133 (InI. 1991);

People v. Hrobowski, 575 N.E.2d 1320, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct.) (refusing to reconsider People v. Jerome, 564 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), which held

mitigating factors do not negate first degree murder's elements), appealdenied,
584 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. 1991); see also Steigmann, supra note 39, at 495 (denying
that a defendant must "prove a factor which would be inconsistent with an element of first degree murder in order to prove by a preponderance the existence
of a mitigating factor to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder").
88. E.g., People v. Smallwood, 586 N.E.2d 636, 647-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991),
appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 28 (1992); People v. Manley, 584 N.E.2d 477, 492 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991); People v. Davis, 583 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 587 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 1992). The Supreme Court has arguably expanded
Pattersonin subsequent cases. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233 (forcing the defendant to carry the burden of affirmatively proving self-defense to a

homicide charge), reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 649-50 (1990) (discussing the constitutionality of the defendant's burden to prove mitigation to avoid the death penalty at a sentencing hearing).
89. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 594-95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992).
90. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds sub num. 113 S.Ct. 2112 (1993).
91. People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ill. 1986) (finding nothing in the
definition of voluntary manslaughter that contains language "distinguishing it
from murder in regard to the defendant's intention or mental state"); see also
Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 594 (rejecting the defendant's contention "that the legislature.., intended to retain the notion that the definition of first degree mur-

der included 'malice aforethought,' whereas the definition of second degree
murder did not").
92. Cook, 576 N.E.2d at 1320-21; Hrobowski, 575 N.E.2d at 1320.
93. 576 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 133 (Ill.
1991).
94. 575 N.E.2d 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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their analysis stating that the Due Process Clause precludes convictions unless there is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."9 5 The
Cook court then noted, however, "[T]he [Illinois Criminal] Code
does not require the [second degree murder] defendant to prove any
elements of first degree murder.. ."96 Relying on Patterson,courts
like the Cook court point out that it is permissible for the State to
require the defendant to prove mitigation.9 7 Using Pattersonas authority, they reject defendants' Due Process claims, finding that requiring the defense to establish a mitigating factor does not
impermissibly shift any burden to the defendant.
B.

Equal Protection Challenges

Along with Due Process claims, courts also reject arguments
that the statute violates defendants' equal protection rights. 98
There is no distinction between the analysis for assessing violations
of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States9 9 and Illinois' 0 0 Constitutions.' 0 1 The Equal Protection Clause requires the
10 2
government to treat similarly situated individuals similarly.
However, no constitutional provision prohibits the government
from treating dissimilar individuals or dissimilar classes of individuals differently. 10 3
Under Equal Protection analysis, the court first must determine the proper level of scrutiny it will apply to the challenged classification, action or statute. 10 4 When the statute in question affects
06
a fundamental right 05 or discriminates against a suspect class,'
95. Cook, 576 N.E.2d at 1244 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)) (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
98. E.g., People v. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d 1020, 1021-23 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1991); People v. Gore, 571 N.E.2d 1041, 1047-48 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. 1991); People v. Clark, 565 N.E.2d
1373, 1376-79 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 918 (Ill. 1991).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("No State... [shall] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
100. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 2 ("No person shall.., be denied the equal
protection of the laws").
101. People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 457 (Ill. 1992).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. There is an abundance of authority discussing what rights are fundamental. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (guaranteeing a woman's
right to make specific choices regarding her body); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (guarding the fundamental right to interstate travel);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (protecting the freedom to marry
spouse of one's own choice); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963)
(paving the way for free access to the courts); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1963) (invalidating poll tax which violated the fundamental right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
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courts will apply a strict scrutiny test and uphold the statute only if
the State proves the statute is necessarily related to a compelling
State interest.10 7 If the statute affects neither a fundamental right
nor a suspect class, courts apply a rational basis test.10 8 Under this
minimal scrutiny, a statutory scheme need only rationally relate to
a legitimate state interest to be found constitutional.10 9
Requiring the defense to prove the mitigation to a homicide
does not discriminate against a suspect class or involve a fundamental right. Therefore, courts analyze the second degree murder
statute with the lesser, rational basis test. i 0 Under this minimal
scrutiny, the statute carries a presumption of rationality which the
defendant must overcome."' l Hence, defendants must convince the
court that the statute does not relate to any legitimate state interests. 1 2 This extremely difficult task overcomes most opponents to
(preserving a couple's right to procreate). But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973) (finding that education is not a fundamental right); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (stating there is no

fundamental right to "decent shelter").
106. Many cases have also discussed the application of the suspect class rationale. E.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (finding an impermissible practice where an election board noted the race of candidates on the
ballot); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (finding the sepa-

rate but equal doctrine to be inherently discriminatory and holding that it is

impermissible to discriminate by race in public schools). But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (holding that wealth classifications do not trigger
strict scrutiny analysis); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313-14 (1976) (finding that age qualifications do not require strict
scrutiny).

107. People v. Reed, 591 N.E.2d 455, 457 (Ill. 1992). Governmental action
rarely survives the strict scrutiny test. Such analysis has been described as
"strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term-Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Indeed, at least two
Supreme Court Justices expressed their "unrelieved discomfort with what

seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy
phrases as 'compelling state interests' and 'least drastic or restrictive means.'"
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233-34

(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun described
the terms themselves as "too convenient and result oriented." Illinois State Bd.
of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979) (concurring).

He thus reiterated his belief that the test "merely announc[e] an inevitable re-

sult, and the [test is] no test at all." Id.
108. Reed, 591 N.E.2d at 457; People v. Simmons, 583 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ill.
1991).
109. Reed, 591 N.E.2d at 457.
110. People v. Davis, 583 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied,
587 N.E.2d 1018 (111. 1992); People v. Clark, 565 N.E.2d 1373, 1376 (Ill. App.
Ct.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 918 (Ill. 1991).

111. Clark, 565 N.E.2d at 1378; People v. Gore, 571 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill.

App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. 1991); cf People v. Fabing, 570
N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ill. 1991) (presuming the statute's constitutionality and forcing the challenging party to clearly establish the constitutional defect).
112. Clark, 565 N.E.2d at 1378; Gore, 571 N.E.2d at 1048.
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laws alleged to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 1 13
Defendants argue that Illinois' statute deters those convicted of
second degree murder from appealing their convictions, because on
retrial, they may face a charge of first degree murder. 114 The argument notes that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder, I x5 then jumps to the conclusion that if
a defendant had his second degree murder conviction reversed and

remanded for a new trial, he subsequently could be retried for first
degree murder. 1 16 Courts, however, have rejected this view, based
upon either double jeopardy or collateral estoppel principles.
Courts which find second degree murder to be a lesser included offense of first degree murder automatically conclude double jeopardy
precludes a retrial for first degree murder. 117 Courts which find
collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of the mitigation issue
also say it precludes the trial court from convicting a defendant for
first degree murder when the court initially convicted him or her of
second degree murder. 118 Therefore, both lines of cases reach the
113. E.g., Clark, 565 N.E.2d at 1379; Gore, 571 at 1048. Several courts have
even found the State's interest here to be compelling, thereby suggesting the
second degree murder statute would survive the rigors of strict scrutiny analysis. E.g., Davis, 583 N.E.2d at 67; People v. Wright, 578 N.E.2d 1090, 1099 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991).
114. E.g., People v. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1991). This argument is unusual to hear from the
defense, as it would seemingly place a defendant in a worse than desirable position on remand. Of course, those convicted of second degree murder must assume that posture in order to claim the statute deterred them from appealing
their convictions.
115. If second degree murder were a lesser included offense of first degree
murder, a conviction for second degree murder would constitute an implied acquittal of first degree murder. Therefore a retrial for first degree murder would
be impossible due to constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. See, e.g.,
People v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). In order to create
the appearance that a retrial places the defendant at risk, this defense theory
accepts the premise that second degree murder is not lesser included in first
degree murder. E.g., Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022. This argument, however,
ignores the effects of collateral estoppel in precluding a retrial for first degree
murder. See infra notes 272-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
effects of collateral estoppel on subsequent retrials in this context. Defendants
argue that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree
murder for other purposes as well. See, e.g., People v. Swanson, 570 N.E.2d
503, 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (rejecting the argument that if second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder, the defendant must
request consideration of the lesser offense before a court in a bench trial may do
so).

116. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022.
117. E.g., Timberson, 573 N.E.2d at 376. See infra notes 206-227 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lesser included offense relationship and the
first and second degree murder statutes.
118. E.g., Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022; People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583,
597 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992). See infra
notes 293-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of collateral
estoppel on a retrial after an appellate court reverses and remands a second
degree murder conviction.
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same conclusion.
In examining this issue, the court in People v. Thomas discussed the relationships between the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes under the old system, as well as between the
first and second degree murder statutes under the current law. 1 1 9
The trial court convicted the defendant of second degree murder,
but the appellate court reversed and remanded his case for a new
trial.' 20 On retrial, the defendant argued that under the new first
and second degree murder formulation, a second degree murder defendant could face a first degree murder conviction at retrial. As
second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree
murder, he claimed double jeopardy cannot protect a second degree
murder defendant from facing a conviction for first degree murder
12
at retrial.
The Thomas court found that the Criminal Code 1 2 2 protects the
second degree murder defendant from a retrial for first degree murder.1 23 Rather than double jeopardy, Section 3-4(b)(2) embodies the
common law doctrine of collateral estoppel. i 24 When a prosecutor
charges first degree murder and the jury finds the defendant guilty
of second degree murder, the trier of fact necessarily determined
the defendant proved the existence of a mitigating factor. 125 As a
result, courts cannot allow relitigation of the mitigation issue in
any subsequent trial, and the trier of fact may only convict the defendant of second degree murder.' 2 6 Thus, the Thomas court concluded, the law treats defendants convicted of second degree
murder no differently from other criminal defendants, and it does
not discourage them from appealing their convictions any more
119.

576 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill.

1991).
120. Id.
121. Id. See infra notes 156-167 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the lesser included offense doctrine.

122. Illinois law provides:
(b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted

for a different offense, or for the same offense based upon different facts, if
such former prosecution:
(2) Was terminated by a final order or judgement, even if entered
before trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution ....
720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(2) (1992).
123. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022. The Thomas court adopted the view that
collateral estoppel, rather than double jeopardy, prevents a court from retrying

the defendant for first degree murder. Id.
124. Id. at 1022.
125.

Id. at 1023.

126. Id. See infra notes 293-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the effects of collateral estoppel on a defendant facing retrial after an appellate
court reverses and remands his second

degree

murder conviction.
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than other defendants. 127
C.

Separation of Powers Challenges and the State Charging
Second Degree Murder

Illinois' separation of powers doctrine provides the most interesting constitutional challenge. 128 Under this argument, the second degree murder statute, by empowering the defendant to elect
the second degree instruction to the jury and requiring him to prove
the mitigation, 12 9 implicitly restricts the prosecution to charging
him only with first degree murder. Proponents of this argument
claim this would be a legislative infringement upon the Executive's
discretion to charge an individual with a particular crime. 130 No
court has yet agreed. In fact, courts have specifically rejected this
13 1
argument.
Indeed, after initial confusion on this point, 132 courts now conclude the State can initially charge a defendant with second degree
murder. 133 Beginning with People v. Burks,'3 4 courts noted that no
language in the statute explicitly prevents a charging instrument
from alleging second degree murder, 13 5 and the General Assembly
127. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1023.
128. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. II, § 1 (mandating that "[t]he legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate" and that "[n]o branch shall exercise
powers belonging to another").
129. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992).
130. E.g., People v. Davis, 583 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 1992); People v. Gore, 571 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appealdenied, 580 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. 1991); People v. Clark, 565 N.E.2d
1373, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 918 (Ill. 1991).
131. See, e.g., Davis, 583 N.E.2d at 67 (noting that the State may charge a
defendant with second degree murder); Gore, 571 N.E.2d at 1048 (stating that
the statute does not prohibit the State from charging a defendant with second
degree murder); Clark, 565 N.E.2d at 1379 (stating that the State may use its
discretion to charge a defendant with second degree murder); People v. Burks,
545 N.E.2d 782, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding the State can initially charge a
defendant with second degree murder).
132. One of the statute's authors originally argued that the State would be
precluded from charging a defendant with second degree murder. Steigmann,
supra note 38, at 496. He has since adopted the logic of People v. Burks, 545
N.E.2d 782, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), and argues that the State, by charging
second degree murder, simply concedes the mitigation issue in favor of the defendant. Telephone Interview with Hon. Robert J. Steigmann, Justice of the
Illinois Appellate Court (Oct. 3, 1992).
133. E.g., Davis, 583 N.E.2d at 67; Gore, 571 N.E.2d at 1048; Clark, 565
N.E.2d at 1379; Burks, 545 N.E.2d at 784.
134. 545 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
135. Davis, 583 N.E.2d at 67; Gore, 571 N.E.2d at 1048; Burks, 545 N.E.2d at
784; see 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (1992) (providing the elements of second degree murder). Courts additionally note that the language in the statute also treats jury
and bench trials differently. See, e.g., People v. Swanson, 570 N.E.2d 503, 506
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting the varied application of the statute in jury and
bench trials). In a jury trial, the defendant must elect to have the jury consider
convicting him of second degree murder. Id. He may prevent the jury from
considering second degree murder as an option and "roll the dice" in the hope
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did not intend such a result. 13 6 They note the procedure requiring
the defendant to prove mitigation outlined in Subsection (c) of the
second degree murder statute speaks only to the situation in which
the prosecution initially charges the defendant with first degree
murder. 137
By charging a defendant with second degree murder, the State
alleges it can prove the elements of first degree murder, but concedes the presence of mitigation. 138 As such, if the State charges a
defendant with second degree murder and proves the elements of
first degree murder, the trier of fact can only find the defendant
guilty of second degree murder. 139 This places the defendant in
exactly the same position as a second degree murder defendant
when a court reverses and remands his conviction. 140 In both instances, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
the elements of first degree murder. 14 1 Should it do so, the presonly appropriate
ence of mitigation is no longer an issue, and the
142
guilty verdict would be second degree murder.
In response to Burks, the new Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions contain directions for the jury when the State initially charges
second degree murder.14 3 The Committee Note to Instruction 7.01S
acknowledges the peculiar circumstances of a defendant being
the jury would acquit rather than convict him for first degree murder. 720
ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992); Swanson, 570 N.E.2d at 506. At least one court noted that
the language of the statute speaks only to jury trials. Swanson, 570 N.E.2d at
506. Thus, the court said a defendant in a bench trial need not elect the second
degree murder option for conviction, and consequently may not prevent a court
sitting as trier of fact from considering convicting him for second degree murder. Id. In other words, the defendant in a bench trial does not have the right
to "roll the dice." Id.
136. Burks, 545 N.E.2d at 783; see also S. 522, 84th Ill. Gen. Ass'y 38 (May
23, 1985) (quoting Senator Sangmeister: "[W]e think that prosecutors will
charge [second degree murder] when it is a manslaughter case the way they
properly should").
137. Gore, 571 N.E.2d at 1049; Clark, 565 N.E.2d at 1379; see 720 ILCS 5/92(c) (1992).
138. People v. Golden, 614 N.E.2d 444, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Gore, 571
N.E.2d at 1049; Burks, 545 N.E.2d at 783; see I.P.I.-CRIMINAL (1992), supra
note 51, No. 7.01S, Committee Note.
139. Clark, 565 N.E.2d at 1379; I.P.I.- CRIMINAL (1992), supra note 51, No.
7.01S, Committee Note.
140. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 597-98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992).
141. Burks, 545 N.E.2d at 783-84.
142. Id.
143. The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions state:
A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he kills an
individual [without lawful justification] if, in performing the acts which
cause the death,
[1] he intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual [or another]; [or]
[2] he knows that such acts will cause death to that individual [or another]; [or]

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:61

charged with second degree murder, but finds that in such circumstances "the State is required to prove the elements of first degree
murder, but if it satisfies the jury it has done so, the only verdict
and judgement to which it is entitled is guilty of second degree murder." 144 The Supreme Court Committee found that "[t]his result

follows because the State... has conceded the presence of the mitigating factor that reduces the defendant's criminal behavior from
145
first degree murder to second degree murder."
In People v. Clark,146 the defendant argued the second degree
murder statute violated the Separation of Powers Clause by removing the State's Attorney's discretion to charge second degree murder. 147 Relying on Burks, the court rejected this claim and found
two rationales to support its conclusion. 148 First, it relied upon
prosecutorial ethics, stating "it would seem to be an impermissible
exercise of prosecutorial discretion for a prosecutor to charge a defendant with a crime the prosecutor knows the defendant did not
commit." 1 49 Thus, the prosecutor must be able to charge a defend-

ant with second degree murder if he believes sufficient mitigation
exists precluding a first degree murder conviction. Second, the
court notes the statute "only refers to the circumstances where the
State charges first degree murder and the defendant wants to reduce it to second degree murder."150 As such, the court implicitly
concludes the statute does not preclude the State from initially
charging the defendant with second degree murder. The court
[3] he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to that individual [or another].
I.P.I.-CRIM1NAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 7.01S.
The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions further provide:
To sustain the charge of second degree murder, the State must prove
the following propositions:
First proposition:That the defendant performed the acts which caused
the death of _
.; and
Second proposition:That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to _
; [or]
[2] he knew that his acts would cause death to _
; [or]
(3] he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to __
.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of
these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of
these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant not guilty.

Id. at No. 7.02S.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at No. 7.01S, Committee Note.
Id.
565 N.E.2d 1373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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15 1
therefore denied the defendant's separation of powers challenge.

V.

INCLUSION VERSUS EXCLUSION: WHETHER SECOND DEGREE
MURDER IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF FIRST
DEGREE MURDER

If an appellate court reverses a conviction for second degree
murder and remands the case for retrial, different theories can affect the course of that trial. The generally accepted premise is that
once a court finds a defendant guilty of second degree murder, the
defendant may not later be convicted of first degree murder.
The
152
underlying rationales, however, vary between courts.
Since Illinois introduced separate degrees, 153 courts have attempted to further classify the two types of murder. Central to this
study is whether second degree murder is a lesser included offense
of first degree murder. Various courts, relying on different reason15 4
ing and support, have reached contrary conclusions.
The determination of whether second degree murder is lesser
included within first degree murder has an even greater importance. If second degree murder is currently understood to be distinct from first degree murder, and not lesser included, courts can
easily apply the statutes. If, however, second degree murder is
viewed as a lesser included offense within first degree murder, it
becomes simple for a court to inaccurately apply the law, oftentimes
55
at the expense of the defendant. 1
In order to understand the nature of the relationship between
the first and second degree murder statutes, the improper application of the lesser included offense relationship in the first and second degree murder context should be discussed.
151. Clark, 565 N.E.2d at 1379.
152. Compare People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(relying on collateral estoppel and lesser mitigated offense theories), appealdenied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992) with People v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374, 375
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (relying on the lesser included offense and double jeopardy
theories).
153. PA 84-1450 became effective July 1, 1987. People v. Shumpert, 533
N.E.2d 1106, 1111 (Ill. 1989).
154. Compare People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (4th
Dist.) (holding that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first
degree murder because it does not have fewer elements nor does it require a
less culpable mental state than first degree murder), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d
1022 (Ill. 1992) with People v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(5th Dist.) (concluding second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first
degree murder because second degree murder is more comparable to voluntary
manslaughter, which was a lesser included offense of murder), appeal denied,
580 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1991).
155. E.g., People v. Collins, 572 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1991)
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The Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses

Before analyzing the application of the lesser included offense
doctrine in the first and second degree murder context, there must
be an understanding of Illinois' law of lesser included offenses. A
lesser included offense is typically one in which the elements of the
lesser offense form a subset of the elements of the offense
1 56
charged.
Under Illinois' statutory test, a crime is a lesser included offense of another if either: (1) the offense involves the same or fewer
statutory elements than comprise the greater offense; or (2) the
lesser crime requires a lesser mental state. 15 7 The following hypothetical highlights the elements test. An individual commits the
offense of, for example, unlawful restraint "when he knowingly
without legal authority detains another." 158 The elements of the
offense, therefore, are that the defendant had the requisite mental
state of knowledge, that he acted without legal authority, and that
he detained another. 15 9 To convict an individual for aggravated unlawful straint, the State must prove the defendant "knowingly
without legal authority detain[ed] another while using deadly
force." 16 0 To convict for the more serious offense, therefore, the
State must prove the same three elements from unlawful restraint
156. People v. Kimball, 614 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); see also People v. Kerrick, 77 P. 711, 712 (Cal. 1904) ("To be necessarily included in the

offense charged, the lesser offense must not only be part of the greater as in
fact, but it must be embraced within the legal definition of the greater as a part
thereof'); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 719-21 (1989) (maintaining that "the elements of the offense of odometer tampering are not a subset
of the elements of the crime of mail fraud," and that odometer tampering is
therefore not a lesser included offense of mail fraud); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.07(4)(a) (Official Draft 1962) (mandating that one offense is a lesser included offense of another when "it is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged....").
Proof of the greater offense is also proof of the lesser included offense.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977). Brown employs the "Blockburger
analysis" for determining when two offenses are the "same" for double jeopardy
purposes. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (describing the test as "whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not"); see also United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993) (reaffirming the Blockburger test as the only indicator of whether two offenses are
the same for double jeopardy purposes). The Brown Court, however, dealt with
issues of double jeopardy, and explicitly declined to address "questions that
may arise.., after a conviction is reversed on appeal." Brown, 432 U.S. at 165
n.5. The latter, however, is precisely the situation here.
157. 720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (1992). These tests are known as the "elements test"
and the "mental state test." For example, the inchoate offense is lesser included
in the offense charged. 720 ILCS 5/2-9(b) (1992).
158. 720 ILCS 5/10-3 (1992).
159. See People v. Williams, 582 N.E.2d 1158, 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing the elements of unlawful restraint), appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 30 (Ill.
1992).
160. 720 ILCS 5/10-3.1 (1992) (emphasis added).
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plus the added component of deadly force. 16 1 As the elements of
unlawful restraint form a complete subset of aggravated unlawful
restraint, it is a lesser included offense of its aggravated counterpart under the elements test.
An offense can also be lesser included in another if it requires a
lesser mental state. 162 A conviction for first degree murder, for example, requires the defendant to unlawfully take the life of another
with either an intentional or knowing state of mind. 16 3 Involuntary
manslaughter, on the other hand, is also an unlawful killing, but
only requires the defendant to have acted recklessly.16 4 In other
words, the primary distinction between first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter is the mental state set forth in the statute. 165 Recklessness, of course, is a less culpable mental state than
intent and knowledge. 16 6 As such, involuntary manslaughter is a
161. See People v. Bloyer, 558 N.E.2d 1056, 1057 (Ill. App. Ct.) (discussing
the enhancement of unlawful restraint to aggravated unlawful restraint by the
presence of a dangerous weapon), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 841 (Ill. 1990).
162. 720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (1992).
163. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992). A court may also convict a person of first
degree murder through the felony murder provision. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)
(1992).
164. People v. Reeves, 593 N.E.2d 683, 691 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 602
N.E.2d 469 (Ill. 1992); see 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (1992) (providing that the state of
mind for involuntary manslaughter is recklessness). Illinois defines recklessness as a "conscious disregard [of] a substantial and unjustifiable risk...." 720
ILCS 5/4-6 (1992).
165. Reeves, 593 N.E.2d at 691.
166. Illinois law describes intent in the following manner: "A person intends,
or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct
described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or
purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct." 720 ILCS 5/4-4
(1992).
The Illinois provision regarding knowledge is a bit more detailed:
A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct described by
the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a
material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such
fact exists.
(b) The result of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain
to be caused by his conduct.
Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully,
within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute
clearly requires another meaning.
720 ILCS 5/4-5 (1992).
The Criminal Code defines reckless as follows:
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a
reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of the statute using the
latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.
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lesser included offense of first degree murder due to its lesser
mental state. 16 7 It is the less culpable mental state which is at the
heart of the debate whether second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder.
B. Differing JudicialApplications of the Lesser Included
Analysis to the Murder Statutes
Illinois courts are split on whether second degree murder is
lesser included in first degree murder. 168 Those courts deciding
that second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder rely upon the second prong of the statutory test by
finding that the second degree murder statute requires a lesser
mental state than its first degree sibling. 16 9 Other courts vigorously oppose this construction of the statute. 170
1. The Lesser Mental State: Courts Finding that Second Degree
Murder Is a Lesser Included Offense of First Degree
Murder
To support the conclusion that second degree murder requires
a lesser mental state than first degree murder, courts invariably
rely upon People v. Hoffer. 17 1 Courts interpret Hoffer as holding
that voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of mur720 ILCS 5/4-6 (1992).
167. Reeves, 593 N.E.2d at 691.
168. E.g., People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (4th
Dist.) (holding that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first
degree murder), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992); People v. Thomas,
576 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (1st Dist.) (finding that second degree
murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder), appeal denied,
580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1991); People v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374, 375 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (5th Dist.) (classifying second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree murder); People v. Collins, 572 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (Ill. App.
Ct.) (1st Dist.) (concluding second degree murder is a lesser included offense of
first degree murder), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1991).
169. E.g., People v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ill. App. Ct.) (5th Dist.);
People v. Swanson, 570 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (1st Dist.). Indeed,
courts finding second degree murder to be a lesser included offense of first degree murder usually admit "second degree murder is not established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to prove first degree murder .... "
and concede that second degree murder cannot be a lesser included offense of
first degree murder under the elements test. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d at 377; cf
People v. Brown, 578 N.E.2d 1168, 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appealdenied, 591
N.E.2d 25 (Ill. 1992).
170. See O'Neill, supra note 39, at 224 (discussing this opposition);
Steigmann, supra note 39, at 497 (noting the basis for the rejection of the lesser
included theory). See infra notes 182-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts which hold that second degree murder is not a lesser included
offense.
171. 478 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1985).
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der. 17 2 The Hoffer court based its finding upon its belief that voluntary manslaughter required a less culpable mental state than
murder. 173 Recently, some courts have transposed the Hoffer finding onto the new first and second degree murder statutes. 174 These
courts reason that second degree murder's mental state must similarly be less culpable than that required for a first degree murder
conviction.176
While it may be simple to state that second degree murder is
lesser included in first degree murder merely because voluntary
manslaughter was lesser included in murder, this analysis is not
intellectually complete. The implicit logic underlying "less culpable" is that malice aforethought is an element required by the first
degree murder statute, and second degree murder is first degree
murder without malice. This is a carry-over from the courts' former
framework in dealing with murder and voluntary manslaughter.
Prior to the adoption of the 1961 Criminal Code, malice aforethought was an element of murder, while voluntary manslaughter
was essentially murder without malice. 176 In order to maintain
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder after
the adoption of the 1961 Criminal Code, courts stated that the new
voluntary manslaughter still required a lesser mental state than
murder, implicitly believing that the "no malice" aspects of the old
1 77
voluntary manslaughter were still part of the crime.
For example, the Fifth District Appellate Court, in People v.
Timberson,178 wrote, "Although second degree murder is not established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts required to
prove first degree murder, we think it does involve a less culpable
mental state." 179 The court noted that voluntary manslaughter
was a lesser included offense of murder, and reasoned that "second
degree murder must [therefore] be considered a lesser included of172. See People v. Russell, 574 N.E.2d 258, 261-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting

Hoffer's holding that first degree murder is a lesser included offense); People v.

Swanson, 570 N.E. 2d 503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (quoting from Hoffer). But
see, e.g., People v. Newburn, 579 N.E.2d 583, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (agreeing
with Professor O'Neill's argument that voluntary manslaughter was not a
lesser included offense of murder).
173. Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d at 340.
174. E.g., Swanson, 570 N.E.2d at 506.
175. See id. ("This same reasoning [from Hoffer), of course, applies to first
and second degree murder"); Timberson, 573 N.E.2d at 377 (noting: "[O]ur

supreme court recognized that the mitigating elements of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, which are identical to those of the crime of second degree
murder, represent mental states of lesser culpability").
176. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961.
177.

Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d at 340.

178. 573 N.E.2d 374
179. Id. at 377.

(Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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fense of first degree murder."i8 0 The court assumed that the established principles regarding the application of voluntary
manslaughter could similarly apply to the new statutory schemes
involving first and second degree murder. This reasoning survives
today. 181

2. Mentally Second to None: Courts FindingIdentical Mental
States in First and Second Degree Murder
Other Illinois courts conclude that second degree murder cannot be a lesser included offense of first degree murder.' 8 2 After
agreeing that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense
of first degree murder under the elements test, these courts also
deny the existence of a lesser included offense relationship based
upon the conclusion that the required mental states for first and
i8 3
second degree murder are identical.
In order to obtain a conviction for first degree murder, the
State must prove the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly.' 8 4 To reduce the offense to second degree murder, the stat85
ute requires the defendant to prove one of the mitigating factors.1
These factors, however, do not affect the mental state as established by the State. Instead, these courts hold that they simply
establish a factor which lawmakers are willing to recognize in allowing a reduction in the severity of the punishment.' 8 6
In rejecting the contention that the establishment of mitigation
is proof of a less culpable mental state, courts argue or imply that
malice aforethought is not an element of either offense.' 8 7 These
courts often note that the concept of malice aforethought is not a
part of the language of the first and second degree murder statutes.' 8 8 Thus some Illinois courts find that, unlike the situation in
180. Id.
181. People v. Swanson, 570 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
182. E.g., People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (11. App. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992); People v. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d 1020, 1022
(Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1991); see O'Neill, supra note
39, at 224; Steigmann, supra note 39, at 497.
183. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 594-95; cf. People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973,
978 (Ill. 1986) (finding no inconsistency between the mental states required by

the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes under the 1961 Criminal
Code).
184. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992). See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the State's burden of proof under the first degree murder
statute.
185. 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (1992). See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the defendant's burden in reducing the homicide to second

degree murder.
186.

People v. Cook, 576 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584

N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1991); People v. Hrobowski, 575 N.E.2d 1306, 1320-21 (Ill. App.
Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. 1991).
187. E.g., Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 594.
188. Id.
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Mullaney v. Wilbur,i s 9 when a defendant argues there is sufficient
mitigation to reduce the offense to second degree murder, he is not
negating the mental state established by the State.190
In People v. Thomas, the court addressed the lesser included
offense issue when a defendant brought an equal protection challenge to the statute.' 9 ' The defendant posited that second degree
murder was not a lesser included offense of first degree murder.192
The court agreed.' 93 The court noted that second degree murder is
19 4
It implic"first degree murder plus the element of mitigation."

itly assumed this has two effects. First, the court summarily concluded second degree murder cannot be a lesser included offense
under the elements test, as no subset of first degree murder elements defines second degree murder.' 9 5 Second, and more significantly, the mental state required for second degree murder must be
the same as first degree murder: intent or knowledge. 196 Otherwise, the defendant's establishment of mitigation would negate the
197
mental state as proved by the prosecution.
In People v. Cook 198 and People v. Hrobowski,199 the defendants similarly argued that the required mental state for second degree murder was less than that required for first degree murder.
The Cook court explicitly noted the defendants' heavy reliance on
Hoffer.20 0 The defendant there argued that, according to Hoffer,
the mental states involved in murder and voluntary manslaughter
189. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Mullaney, malice, mental states and the burden of proof.
190. People v. Golden, 614 N.E.2d 444, 450-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
191. 576 N.E.2d 1020 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill.
1991). See supra notes 98-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of equal
protection issues in the context of the first and second degree murder statutes.
192. Id. at 1022.
193. Id. The defendant then argued that after the court reversed his initial
second degree murder conviction and remanded his case for a new trial, the new
trial could end in his conviction for first degree murder because the principles of
double jeopardy would not apply to protect him. Id. After agreeing with the
defendant that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first
degree murder, and that double jeopardy is therefore inapplicable, the court
found that collateral estoppel prohibited the defendant from a subsequent conviction for first degree murder. Id. at 1022-23. See infra notes 293-307 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the role of collateral estoppel in first and
second degree murder trials.
194. Id. (citing Steigmann, supra note 39 at 497).
195. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022.
196. Id.
197. The fact that the defendant's establishment of mitigation negated the
mental state proven by the prosecution was a fatal flaw in Mullaney. 421 U.S.
684, 694 (1975). See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Mullaney.
198. 576 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 133 (Ill.
1991).
199. 575 N.E.2d 1306 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 134 (Ill.
1991).

200.

Cook, 576 N.E.2d at 1244.
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are inconsistent. 2 0 1 The defendant's argument concluded the
"mental states in first and second degree murder are inconsistent
as well."20 2 Hrobowski was a virtually identical case with the same

result. Both the Cook and Hrobowski courts, quoting from People v.
Jerome,20 3 found "no inherent inconsistency between the mental
states for first and second degree murder."204 The courts therefore
held that provocation or an unreasonable belief in justification by
self-defense does not affect the elements of first degree murderincluding the required mental states. 20 5 Having concluded that
both the first and second degree murder statutes require the same
mental state, these courts found second degree murder cannot be
lesser included in first degree murder.
C. Lesser Included Offenses, Murder and Old Shoes: Second
Degree Murder Cannot Be a Lesser Included Offense of
First Degree Murder
In attempting to determine the relationship between first and
second degree murder, some courts inappropriately try to fit second
degree murder into the "comfortable old shoe"20 6 of being a lesser
included offense of first degree murder. 20 7 As one court put it, this
characterization was attractive "simply because no other recognized
description seem[ed] to fit."20

Nonetheless, one cannot bootstrap

the murder statutes to fit the lesser included offense design.
Simple statutory construction leads to the inescapable conclusion that the language of the statutes precludes an application of
the lesser included offense analysis. The second degree murder
statute begins by stating that "[a] person commits the offense of
second degree murder when he commits the offense of first degree
murder .
,,"209 By its own definition, second degree murder finds
its predicate in first degree murder. As such, the statute presupposes that the defendant acted with an intentional or knowing state
of mind-the mental state the prosecution established in proving
201. Id. at 1245.
202. Id.
203. 564 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 152
(24.1991).
204. Cook, 576 N.E.2d at 1245; Hrobowski, 575 N.E.2d at 1320.
205. Cook, 576 N.E.2d at 1245; Hrobowski, 575 N.E.2d at 1320.
206.

People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal de-

nied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992).
207. See supra notes 182-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of Illinois decisions analyzing second degree murder as a lesser included offense of
first degree murder.
208. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 588.
209. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (1992). Second degree murder does not apply under
the felony-murder provisions of the first degree murder statute. Id.; 720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(3) (1992).
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first degree murder. 2 10
To reduce the offense to second degree murder, the defendant
must establish that "he commit[ted] the offense of first degree murder . . . and either of the . . . mitigating factors [were] pres-

ent. . .. "211 Thus, the first and second degree murder statutes
require the same predicate mental states. This is no great discovery, as all the elements of first degree murder must be present to
convict the defendant of second degree murder. If the State fails to
prove any of the elements of first degree murder, the defendant cannot be guilty of either first or second degree murder. 2 12 There is no
reason the requisite mental state is any different from the other
elements of the offense.
The statute's critics point to the defendant's burden of establishing mitigation in reducing the killing to second degree murder
as tantamount to proving a lesser mental state. However, Illinois
only recognizes four mental states. 2 13 First degree murder requires
proof of either intent or knowledge. 2 14 If the second degree murder
statute required a lesser mental state, presumably it would be one
2 15
of recklessness, the next level recognized by the Criminal Code.
If that were the case, however, second degree murder would be indistinguishable from involuntary manslaughter. 216 The Legislature clearly could not have intended such an absurd result.
Moreover, subsequent developments in the law preclude the
notion that the second degree murder statute requires a lesser
mental state. To convict for first degree murder, the State must
prove the defendant, either intentionally or knowingly, unlawfully
210.

People v. Golden, 614 N.E.2d 444, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The Golden

court wrote:
The Illinois murder statute does not require the defendant to prove a less
culpable mental state to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder. Both degrees of murder require intent to kill or knowledge that one's
act will cause great bodily harm... or a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm.
Id.
See also Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 598 (stating that the mental state for second
degree murder is the same as first degree murder). If the State fails to prove
the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly, the court should acquit the defendant before the second degree murder mitigation issues even arise. Id.
211. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (1992).
212. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 598.
213. 720 ILCS 5/4-4 (intent), 4-5 (knowledge), 4-6 (recklessness), 4-7 (negligence) (1992).
214. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992).
215. 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (1992).
216. See People v. Presley, 595 N.E.2d 606, 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting
that the major difference between first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter is the mental state existing at the time of the homicide), appeal denied, 602 n.E.2d 469 (Ill. 1992). See supra notes 182-205 and accompanying
text for a comparison of the mental states required for murder and involuntary
manslaughter.
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caused the death of another person. 2 17 In prosecuting second de-

gree murder, however, the State must establish exactly the same
elements. 2 18 This includes the mental state: intentionally or
knowingly. The State cannot offer to prove a lesser mental state to
convict the defendant of second degree murder. If it fails to prove
the defendant acted at least knowingly, the defendant cannot be
found guilty of either first or second degree murder. 2 19 Regardless
of which offense with which the defendant is charged, the State
must prove exactly the same elements, including the mental state.
Confusion arises when courts interpret mitigation as a lesser
mental state. Part of this problem is due to some courts' conception
of malice aforethought as the underlying mental state required by
the first degree murder statute. Malice aforethought, however, was
eliminated from the statutes when the legislature adopted the
Criminal Code of 1961.220 The Code clearly states that a "person is
not guilty of an offense ... [unless] he acts while having one of the
mental states as described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7."221 Those
mental states are intent, knowledge, recklessness and negligence. 22 2 Malice aforethought is clearly no longer among those
2 23
mental states recognized under Illinois statutory law.
217. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992).
218. People v. Burks, 545 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Steigmann,
supra note 39, at 497; Criminal I.P.I.-No. 7.02S (1992), supra note 51, which
provides:
To sustain the charge of second degree murder, the State must prove
the following propositions:
FirstProposition:That the defendant performed the acts which caused
the death of _;
and
Second Proposition:That when the defendant did so,
[1] he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to _;
[2] he knew that his acts would cause death to _;

[or]
[or]

[3] he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to
Id. (emphasis added).
219. See I.P.I.-Criminal (1992), supra note 51, Nos. 7.04A, 7.06A
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, your deliberations should end, and you should return a verdict of not guilty .... You may
not consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of second
degree murder until and unless you have first determined that the State
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the previously stated
propositions.
Id.
220. People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ill. 1986); Taylor v. Gilmore, 954
F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 113 S. Ct. 2112
(1993).
221. 720 ILCS 5/4-3(a) (1992). The Code also permits certain strict liability
offenses. 720 ILCS 5/4-3, 4-9 (1992). The first and second degree murder statutes are definitely not within that group.
222. 720 ILCS 5/4-4 to 4-7 (1992).
223. See Wright, 488 N.E.2d at 978 ("With the elimination of malice aforethought as an element of murder..
").
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Voluntary manslaughter, of course, was a crime of lesser culpability than murder. The same holds true today of first and second
degree murders. Indeed, second degree murder is by definition less
culpable than first degree murder. 22 4 That is because second degree murder is a mitigated first degree murder. The mitigation required to establish second degree murder reduces the culpability of
the defendant; hence he receives a less severe penalty.2 25 That mitigation, however, does not automatically translate into a lesser
mental state, at least not as the phrase is used in the Criminal
22
Code as a term of art.

6

The Illinois Supreme Court recently addressed the mental
states for first and second degree murder. It found:
When a jury returns a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter or
second degree murder, the jury has found that the defendant intended
to kill the victim. The... intent to kill was mitigated by the existence
of either a sudden and intense passion or imperfect self-defense. It is
the presence of either of these statutory mitigating factors that reduces
an unlawful homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter
22 7 or second degree murder; it is not the absence of an intent to kill.
Thus, the mitigation reducing a first degree murder to second
degree murder flows from the two enumerated statutory factors:
sudden and intense passion or an unreasonable belief in self-defense. It does not result from a lesser mental state required to
prove second degree murder. Moreover, the mitigation itself does
not amount to a lesser mental state than that required to prove first
degree murder.
VI.

WORKING BACKWARDS: PROBLEMS WITH USING THE LESSER
INCLUDED AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOCTRINES

Lesser included offense issues often arise when an appellate

court reverses and remands a second degree murder conviction for a
224. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (II. 1992).

225.

The maximum sentence for first degree murder is death. Second degree

murder, classified as a Class 1 felony, has a sentencing range of four to fifteen
years. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9-1 and 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1) (1992) (the penalty

for first degree murder) with 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (1992) (providing the penalty for a Class 1 felony).
226. The Illinois Supreme Court has recently analyzed this issue in a similar
context. It stated that "[tihe legislature may choose, if it so decides, to amend
the aggravated battery statute to recognize that it is possible for a defendant to

knowingly or intentionally cause great bodily harm while acting under a sudden or intense passion or under an actual but unreasonable belief in the need
for self-defense." People v. Allen, 606 N.E.2d 1149, 1152-53 (Ill. 1992). This is
exactly what the Legislature has done with the first and second degree murder

statutes. Id.; accord State v. Lee, 818 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
("[W]e cannot conclude that intent or knowledge accompanied by sudden passion exists as a mental state of a lesser degree of culpability than intentional or
knowing.").
227. Allen, 606 N.E.2d at 1152 (emphasis added).
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new trial. If the trial court, on remand, finds that double jeopardy
precludes a charge of first degree murder, its path is clear. All the
trial court needs to do is find that second degree murder is a lesser
included offense of first degree murder. 22 8 After this finding, the
court's path brings it directly to the companion doctrines of implied
acquittal and double jeopardy. The court then holds the initial conviction for second degree murder constituted an implied acquittal of
first degree murder, and it easily finds double jeopardy.
A. Implied Acquittal: On the Road to Double Jeopardy
Generally, conviction of a lesser included offense operates as an
acquittal of the greater charge. 22 9 In Green v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court held that when a jury convicts a defendant of a lesser included offense of the crime originally charged,
but the verdict is silent as to the charged offense itself, the jury has
implicitly acquitted him of the greater offense. 230 Illinois formally
adopted this theory by statute, stating that a "conviction of an included offense is an acquittal of the offense charged."2 3 ' If second
degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder,
the defendant found guilty of second degree murder would automat23 2
ically be acquitted of first degree murder.
B. Final Destination:The Land of Double Jeopardy
The defense of double jeopardy leads courts to analyze the relationship between first and second degree murder. It is well settled
that once a court acquits a defendant of a charge, the State cannot
2 33
subsequently put him or her in jeopardy for the same offense.
Thus, the determination of whether a person is being put in jeopardy more than once is closely related to the question of whether
the one offense is lesser included in another. 23 4 The "guarantee
against double jeopardy affords separate protections against three
228. See United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 281 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[flocusing on greater and lesser offenses is a double jeopardy argument.. ").
229. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957); see also AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 1.08(1) (Official Draft 1962) (promoting

"[a] finding of guilt of a lesser included offense [as] an acquittal of the greater
inclusive offense .... ).
230. 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957).
231. 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a) (1992).
232. E.g., People v. Russell, 574 N.E.2d 258, 262 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People
v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374, 375 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
233. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); see U.S. CONST.
amend. V (mandating that "[n]o person shall.., be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"); ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 10
(providing that "[n]o person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense").
234. State v. Woodfork, 478 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Neb. 1991) (White, J.,
concurring).
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things: (1) a second prosecution after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution after conviction;[ 2 35 ] and (3) multiple punishments for the
same offense." 23 6 Illinois statutory law codifies the theory of double
jeopardy in section 3-4 (a) of the Criminal Code. 23 7 The double
jeopardy prohibition against a subsequent prosecution is effective
when a court convicts a defendant of a lesser included offense of the
crime initially charged. 238 Thus, once a court finds second degree
murder to be a lesser included offense in first degree murder, it automatically finds a subsequent prosecution or retrial for first degree
murder barred under double jeopardy principles. 239 Therefore,
courts using double jeopardy to protect the second degree murder
defendant on remand are likely to find that second degree murder
is a lesser included offense of first degree murder.
C. As Second Degree Murder is Not A Lesser Included Offense in
First Degree Murder, Double Jeopardy Does Not Apply
When a trial court retries a defendant after a reversal of an
initial second degree murder conviction, it innately feels that a conviction for first degree murder would be unfair. 240 Thus, some trial
courts latch onto the double jeopardy nomenclature to limit any
finding of guilt at retrial. 2 4 1 These courts see double jeopardy as a
means to avoid the threat of a defendant being found guilty of first
degree murder at the new trial.
The Double Jeopardy Clause has been described by Chief Justice Rehnquist as "one of the least understood and, in recent years,
one of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of
235. New trials resulting after remands do not trigger double jeopardy. See
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 (1982) (holding that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction generally is subject to retrial); United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1978) (noting that successful appeals based on any claim of
error other than insufficiency of the evidence do not serve to bar retrial); United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 464 (1964) (stating that retrying a defendant
whose conviction is set aside because of error does not violate the double jeopardy provision); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) (noting that

defendant can be retired when he gets his conviction set aside).

236. People v. Stefan, 586 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Ill. 1992).
237. People v. Thomann, 554 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
561 N.E.2d 704 (Ill. 1990), cert. denied sub. nom., 111 S. Ct. 1582 (1991); see 720
ILCS 5/3-4(a) (1992) (providing that prosecution is barred if defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense and the prosecution resulted in a convic-

tion by a final order or judgement, or was terminated improperly after the jury
was impaneled and sworn).
238. 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a) (1992); see Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 421 (1980)

(finding that a conviction of a lesser included offense bars a subsequent trial of
the greater offense).
239. E.g., People v. Timberson, 573 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Swanson, 570 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
240. Cf Tinberson, 573 N.E.2d at 374.
241. Id. at 377; Swanson, 570 N.E.2d at 506.
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Rights."24 2 It forces courts and practitioners through a "veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid
judicial navigator." 243 Indeed, one court has observed that the title
double jeopardy "is periodically invoked by false claimants, such as
the non-double jeopardy look-alikes of dual sovereignty and enhanced punishment and by the double jeopardy reject of compulsory
joinder or same transaction." 24 4 With all the apparent confusion in
this area of the law, it is not surprising that many courts wrongly
apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to the first and second degree
murder relationship.
In order to reach any discussion of double jeopardy, second degree murder must be a lesser included offense of first degree murder. However, second degree murder cannot properly be a lesser
included offense of first degree murder. 24 5 The double jeopardy argument, therefore, is not available as a prophylactic against a conviction for first degree murder at a retrial after a second degree
murder conviction.
D. Problems With Using Lesser Included and
Double Jeopardy Analyses
The following cases demonstrate the application of double jeopardy rules to second degree murder defendants. The appellate
holdings and discussion in People v. Godina246 and People v. Collins2 47 exemplify the necessity of properly understanding the relationship between the first and second degree murder statutes. The
State charged the defendants in both cases with first degree murder. In Godina, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal at the
close of the State's case-in-chief. 248 The court, however, then ordered the State to continue on a charge of second degree murder. 24 9
The defendant, correctly recognizing the inherent inconsistency in
the court's orders, immediately moved for a directed verdict on second degree murder. The defendant claimed that "since the State
had failed to prove first degree murder, the State, as a matter of
242.

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting).

243. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.).
244. Butler v. State, 605 A.2d 186, 186-87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (citations omitted), cert. granted, 612 A.2d 897 (Md. 1992).
245. See supra notes 207-218 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
inapplicability of the lesser included offense analysis to the first and second
degree murder statutes.
246. 584 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 26 (Ill.
1992).
247. 572 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 122 (Ill.
1991).
248. Godina, 584 N.E.2d at 526.
249. Id.

1993]

Murder Plus Mitigation

law, failed to prove the elements of second degree murder." 25 0 The
judge denied the defendant's motion. As a trial can continue on a
lesser included offense after a directed verdict is granted on the
greater charge, the court was implicitly relying upon the lesser included analysis in concluding that the State could proceed on a second degree murder charge without having proven first degree
murder.
Furthermore, the appellate court in Godina demonstrated a remarkable confusion of the issues in handling the case on appeal. In
upholding the trial court on this issue, 2 5 1 the court wrote that "the
trial court determined that the prosecution had met its burden as to
second degree murder by showing that an unjustified killing occurred, and that [the defendant] reasonably believed he was acting
in self-defense when he took part in the acts which led to [the decedent's] death."25 2 As noted above, the prosecution's burden to prove
second degree murder consists of exactly the same elements required under the first degree murder statute. 25 3 Once the State
proves the elements of first degree murder, if a defendant can prove
he acted with a belief in self-defense, the trier of fact must determine if that belief was reasonable. 2 4 If it was not reasonable, the
defendant is guilty of second degree murder. The defendant's belief
in self-defense is a mitigating factor which reduces the first degree
murder charge to a second degree murder conviction. 25 5 Should the
trier of fact determine the belief was reasonable, the defendant has
successfully asserted the affirmative defense of self-defense as described in section 7-1 of the Criminal Code, 25 6 and therefore should
escape conviction. 25 7 Finding that the defendant "reasonably believed he was acting in self-defense when he took part in the acts
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 529. The appellate court reversed on other grounds. Id. at 527.
Godina, 584 N.E.2d at 529-30.
See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing the State's

burden of proof under the first and second degree murder statutes).

254. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (1992).
255. Id. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
mitigating factors in reducing the homicide to second degree murder.
256. State law provides in relevant part that a person "is justified in the use
of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or
great bodily harm to himself or another...." 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (1992). The State
carries the burden to disprove self-defense. People v. Brown, 578 N.E.2d 1168,
1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 25 (Ill. 1992). The reasonableness of such a belief is one element of self-defense. Id. Thus, once the defendant offers sufficient evidence of self-defense, the State must disprove it.
See infra notes 326-331.
257. See People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (explaining the affirmative defense of the justifiable use of force), appeal denied,
587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992); 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (1992) (requiring the reasonableness of the belief).
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which led to [the decedent's] death,"2 58 the court should have acquitted him before doing anything else.
The appellate court further stated, however, that the "trial
judge left it up to the jury to determine whether [the defendant's]
actions in self-defense were reasonable or otherwise unreasonable." 25 9 The court argued that "[riegardless of how the jury decided
that issue, its ultimate determination would not have resulted in an
inconsistent verdict. A verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter
(predecessor to second degree murder) and not guilty of murder are
not inconsistent." 26 0 Although seemingly at odds with its earlier
statement, the court apparently concluded the jury could still have
found the court defendant guilty of second degree murder, in spite
of its earlier conclusion the defendant's actions were reasonable.
In reasoning that a guilty verdict of voluntary manslaughter
was not inconsistent with an acquittal of murder charges, the
Godina implicitly court relied upon the lesser included offense analysis. As previously noted, under the earlier statutes, some courts
found that a guilty verdict for voluntary manslaughter could be consistent with an acquittal of a murder charge by finding voluntary
manslaughter to be a lesser included offense of murder. 2 6 1 In arguing that the same logic applies under the new homicide statutes,
the court implies second degree murder must similarly be a lesser
included offense of first degree murder. Thus, once again, this mischaracterization encourages the court to apply the statutes incorrectly and permits the possibility of an erroneous finding of guilt of
second degree murder. If the court truly determined the defendant
did have a reasonable belief in self-defense, it should have found
2 62
him not guilty.
The Collins court noted that a conviction for voluntary manslaughter was at times a "legal compromise" between a murder conviction and acquittal. 263 The Court found the evidence in that case
"too inconclusive, vague, and contradictory to sustain Collins' conviction of murder in the first degree." 2 64 Nonetheless, the court
258. Godina, 584 N.E.2d at 529-30.
259. Id. at 530.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., People v. Hoffer, 478 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ill.) (stating that the
mental state for voluntary manslaughter was "less culpable" than the mental
state required for murder), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). But see supra
notes 39-45 and accompanying text for an argument that voluntary manslaughter could not have been properly categorized as a lesser included offense of murder under the 1961 Criminal Code.
262. See People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (concluding that the mitigating circumstance of self-defense does not establish
guilt), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992).
263. People v. Collins, 572 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
580 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1991).
264. Id. at 1011.
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found there was "sufficient evidence to support a conviction of second degree murder." 265 Relying on Illinois Supreme Court Rule
615(b)(3), 266 the court ordered that "the degree of murder should be
26 7
reduced under the specific circumstances of this case."
While Rule 615(b)(3) permits an appellate court to reduce the
offense, that "power is only available where a lesser included offense is involved."2 68 Thus, implicit in the Collins decision is a similar, and incorrect, characterization of second degree murder as a
2 69
lesser included offense of first degree murder.
The characterization of second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree murder "is impossible to reconcile with
the plain meaning of the second degree murder statute." 270 However, if a court adopts this classification, the decisions in Godina
and Collins are entirely predictable and understandable. As one
court poignantly stated:
[W]hen an appellate court, as in Collins, determines that the evidence
is "too inconclusive, vague, and contradictory" to sustain a defendant's
conviction of first degree murder, the court would reverse defendant's
conviction outright. Because second degree murder is-by statutory
definition-first degree murder plus a mitigating factor, if the evidence
is insufficient to prove the elements of first degree murder beyond a
reasonable
doubt, no murder conviction of any kind can be permitted to
2 71
stand.

VII.

DIFFERENT ROUTE, SAME DESTINATION: COLLATERAL

ESTOPPEL EFFECTIVELY PREVENTS A FIRST DEGREE
MURDER CONVICTION AT RETRIAL

Having rejected the double jeopardy path to prohibiting a second degree murder defendant from facing a first degree murder
conviction at retrial, courts search for another method of attaining
the same desired goal. Collateral estoppel easily provides the vehicle to reach that result. First, this section discusses the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Second, it analyzes the application of collateral
estoppel in second degree murder cases.
265. Id.
266. 134 Ill. 2d 615(b)(3) (1991). The rule permits an appellate court to "reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted." Id.
267.

Collins, 572 N.E.2d at 1011.

268.

People v. Kick, 576 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

269. See People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (disagreeing with the Collins implication that second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill.

1992).
270. Id.
271.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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The Doctrine of CollateralEstoppel

In one court's "more prosaic terms, the traditional bar of double
jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact
of the crime."2 72 Both theories enable a court to reach the goal of
preventing a subsequent trial on a particular charge. While all
roads may lead to Rome, these two avenues differ. Each theory has
its own requirements and functions at law. Indeed, "collateral estoppel is applicable in criminal cases only when double jeopardy is
not."2 73 Finding double jeopardy inapplicable, some courts properly
turn to collateral estoppel as a bar to a retrial for first degree murder after a reversal of an initial second degree murder
274
conviction.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of
a particular issue at trial. 27 5 While more common in civil law contexts, collateral estoppel plays a vital role in criminal law as
well. 2 76 Indeed, the Criminal Code 2 77 statutorily "embodies the
272. United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 341, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1979). In Dowling
v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the Supreme Court seems to have overruled the underlying holding in Mock. Nonetheless, the court's characterization
of the two doctrines remains true.
273. United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).
274. E.g., People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (I1. 1992); People v. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d 1020, 1022
(Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1991).
275. People v. Moore, 561 N.E.2d 648, 650 (Ill. 1990). The modern doctrine
of collateral estoppel arose from the Roman Law concepts of exceptio rei judicata or res judicata. 2 BLACK ON JUDGEMENTS 601 (1st ed. 1891). By the twelfth
century, the Roman principles of res judicata entered English jurisprudence.
Robert Wyness Millar, The HistoricalRelation of Estoppel by Record to Res
Judicata, 35 U. ILL. L. REV. 41, 44 (1940). Over the centuries, the principles
behind modern collateral estoppel developed and became ingrained in AngloSaxon common law. E.g., Aslin v. Parkin, 2 Burr. 665, 97 Eng. Rep. 501 (KB.
1758) (opinion of Lord Mansfield); 2 JAcoB's LAw

DICTIONARY

441 (1811). The

principles of collateral estoppel have long been part of the common law of the
United States as well. E.g., Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109, 113 (1821)
(stating that a "fact which has been directly tried, and decided by a Court of
competent jurisdiction, cannot be contested again between the same parties. . . ."); Lessee of Parrish v. Ferris, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 606, 609 (1862) ("This
Court acknowledges the rule, and has uniformly applied it, of the conclusiveness of a judgement of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction between the same parties or their privies upon the same question"); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351, 354 (1876) ("[Tlhe judgement of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point is as a plea a bar, or as evidence conclusive between the
same parties upon the same matter directly in question in another court").
276. E.g., People v. Scott, 594 N.E.2d 217, 249 (Ill. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1590 (1993); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948); United
States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
334 (1915).
277. Illinois law provides:
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common law doctrine of collateral estoppel."2 78 To bar the relitigation of an issue, collateral estoppel requires that the issue be controlling or material to both cases. 2 79 Additionally, the original trier
of fact must have actually and necessarily "decided the issue to
28 0
render a verdict."
Collateral estoppel originated in civil law. 28 1 Consequently, in
order to apply the doctrine to criminal case, one must entertain the
different policy considerations which underlie civil and criminal
law. 28 2 In the civil context, "the issues in dispute are private rights
between private parties."28 3 In the criminal case, the "important
public interest is the enforcement of the criminal law accurately
and justly while safeguarding the rights of the accused ...

"284

To ensure the initial trier of fact took sufficient care in determining the matter, collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of
an issue only if it was necessarily decided. 28 5 Moreover, the burden
of raising a collateral estoppel challenge to a prosecution rests on
(b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted
for a different offense, or for the same offense based upon different facts, if
such former prosecution:
(2) Was terminated by final order or judgement, even if entered before
trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary
to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution ....
720 ILCS 5/3-4(b) (1992).
278. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022.
279. Id.
280. Id.; accord Apostoledes v. State, 593 A.2d 1117, 1121 (Md. 1991). In the
civil arena, many courts apply the following rule:
A valid and final personal judgement is conclusive between the parties,
except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(3) A judgement in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in a subsequent action between them on the same or a different
claim, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgement....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 17 (1982).
281. Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93, 98 (Wyo. 1991).
282. Id. See generally Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction,42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (discussing collateral estoppel distinctions between civil and criminal law).

283.

Eatherton, 810 P.2d at 98; see, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGE-

§ 27, cmt. (c) (1982) (discussing the purpose of collateral estoppel: "The
problem involves a balancing of important interests: on the one hand, a desire
not to deprive a litigant of an adequate day in court; on the other hand, a desire
to prevent repetitious litigation of what is essentially the same dispute").
284. Eatherton, 810 P.2d at 98.
285. Pettaway v. Plummer, 943 F.2d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 296 (1992); cf. People v. Scott, 594 N.E.2d 217, 249 (Ill. 1992) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel "if it is not clear that the former judgment or
verdict necessarily decided the factual question at issue in the subsequent
proceeding").
MENTrS,
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the defense. 28 6 In order to meet that burden, the defendant must
show that the prior court favorably resolved the issue he seeks to
foreclose from further litigation, and that the relitigation of that
issue at the subsequent trial could result in the trier of fact reaching a different conclusion on that issue. 28 7 Thus, collateral estoppel
will prevent the State from relitigating a common necessary factual
issue already decided in the defendant's favor.2 88
Parties may employ collateral estoppel either offensively or defensively. 289 "Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a
plaintiff forecloses [a defendant's option of litigating] an issue the
defendant previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action." 2 90
"Defensive use [of collateral estoppel] occurs when a defendant [prevents] a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff previously litigated and lost."29 1

In the parlance of murder, on one hand,

offensive collateral estoppel would bar the defendant from asserting
a claim previously won by the prosecution. 29 2 On the other hand,
defensive collateral estoppel prevents the State from relitigating an
issue upon which the defense was previously triumphant. Defensive collateral estoppel precludes the prosecution from relitigating
the mitigation issue. The doctrine thereby prevents the State from
retrying a defendant on first degree murder charges after a reversal
of a second degree murder conviction. Therefore, collateral estoppel
is an effective defense for a defendant convicted of second degree
murder but remanded to the trial court to face a first degree murder
charge.

286. People v. Winston, 558 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
564 N.E.2d 846 (Ill. 1990); United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 280 (7th Cir.
1992); accord Butler v. State, 605 A.2d 186, 200 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert.
granted, 612 A.2d 897 (Md. 1992).
287. Winston, 558 N.E.2d at 775.
288. Apostoledes v. State, 593 A.2d 1117, 1121 (Md. 1991).
289. In re Owens, 532 N.E.2d 248, 251 (Ill. 1988). The offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel generally appear when one of the subsequent
parties was not a party to the prior litigation. See WARREN FREEDMAN, RES
JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 31 (1988). However, there is nothing limiting this usage to such a scenario. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed.
1990) (providing a broad definition of collateral estoppel).
This terminology first appeared in the civil arena when one of the subsequent parties was absent from the prior litigation. Standefer v. United States,
447 U.S. 10, 21 (1980). This became known as "non-mutual" collateral estoppel.
Id. Whatever its future in civil actions, non-mutual collateral estoppel does not
apply to criminal cases. Id. at 25; accord Butler, 605 A.2d at 194, n.9.
290. Owens, 532 N.E.2d at 251.
291. Id.
292. See infra notes 333-335 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
State's offensive use of collateral estoppel against a criminal defendant.
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Light at the End of the Tunnel: CollateralEstoppel as a Bar
to a First Degree Murder Conviction at Retrial

In a second degree murder case remanded after an appeal for a
new trial, collateral estoppel properly prohibits the State from relitigating the mitigation issue. When the State charges a defendant
with first degree murder, the court may convict him or her of second
degree murder only if the trier of fact makes two findings. First,
the trier of fact must find that the prosecution established all the
elements of first degree murder. 2 93 Second, the trier of fact must be
satisfied that the defense met its burden of proving one of the two
mitigating factors. 2 94 If an appellate court finds some defect with
the State's case, the court can remand it for a new trial. 2 95 Because
the defendant's case-including the establishment of mitigationwill never be found to be tainted, 2 96 collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of the mitigation issue at the new trial. 2 97 In other
words, issue preclusion bars the trier of fact at retrial from reconsidering the sufficiency of any mitigation.
Because the trier of fact may not consider the question of mitigation, the only question at retrial is whether the prosecution can
prove all the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the State meets that burden, with the prior establishment
of mitigation, the guilty verdict must be for second degree
2 98
murder.
Collateral estoppel has become a shorthand term for the general area of issue preclusion. In the remand and retrial situation, it
is really the direct estoppel component of issue preclusion which
prevents the State from relitigating the mitigation issue. If a retrial is a continuation in the life of a criminal prosecution, 29 9 the
293. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992); People v. Thomas, 576 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appealdenied, 580 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1991); People v. Bosek, 569 N.E.2d
551, 565 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 121 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1180 (1992); see 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (1992) (listing the elements of
second degree murder).
294. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 598; Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022; Bosek, 569
N.E.2d at 565; see 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (1992).
295. It is always the defendant who appeals because state law prohibits the
prosecution from appealing such a case in Illinois. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 604(a)
(1991) (listing the instances when the State may appeal). Hence, these remands are always due to a defect found in the prosecution's case.
296. It will not be found to be tainted because it is not an issue the State can
appeal. Cf id. (providing the limited circumstances in which the State may
appeal). Furthermore, common sense dictates that no defendant will appeal a
favorable finding for mitigation.
297. E.g., Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 597-98; Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022-23.
298. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 597-98; Thomas, 576 N.E.2d at 1022-23.
299. See, e.g., United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing retrials in the double jeopardy context). See supra note 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of when a retrial may trigger double jeopardy.
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new trial cannot be truly "collateral," and any issue preclusion
under these circumstances is not "collateral." 300 However, for the
purposes of this Article, the general term "collateral estoppel" includes all the aspects of issue preclusion and direct estoppel.
Upon retrial of a mistried count in a multi-count indictment,
direct estoppel bars the State from relitigating issues at the new
trial that were necessarily and finally decided in the defendant's
favor at the earlier trial. 30 1 "Direct estoppel prevents a party from
relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but
does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the
claim .... -"302 As such, if a defendant is convicted of second degree
murder, the jury's finding of mitigation is final. It becomes binding
and impossible to relitigate at a subsequent retrial. Should the defendant again be found guilty, estoppel limits the conviction to second degree murder.
This places the defendant in the same posture as if the original
charge was for second degree murder. 30 3 When the State initially
charges a defendant with second degree murder, it concedes the
mitigation issue. In such a case, the court must limit the jury's
options to an acquittal of the defendant or a conviction of second
degree murder.3 0 4 The same is true for the defendant whose initial
second degree murder conviction is reversed and remanded for a
new trial. At retrial, defendant faces only an acquittal or a conviction of second degree murder. The court may not convict him of
first degree murder.
In first and second degree murder trials, the jury considers
whether the defendant demonstrated sufficient mitigation to warrant reducing the homicide to second degree murder. 30 5 While "the
300. Bailin, 977 F.2d at 276.
301. Id. A conviction for second degree murder may not immediately appear
to be in the defendant's favor. By convicting him of second degree murder, how-

ever, the jury accepted the defendant's mitigation argument. That is the issue
found in his favor. As one court shrewdly observed: "[a] verdict of guilty of
manslaughter, for instance, is not in one's favor, compared to going free. It is

most definitely in one's favor, however, compared to a verdict of guilty of first
degree murder." Butler v. State, 605 A.2d 186, 198 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert.

granted, 612 A.2d 897 (Md. 1992).

302. Bailin, 977 F.2d at 276 (internal quotations omitted).
303. See supra notes 128-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of initial second degree murder charges.
304.

People v. Burks, 545 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); see I.P.I.-

(1992), supra note 51, No. 7.01S, Committee Note (requiring the State
"to prove the elements of first degree murder, but if it satisfies the jury it has
CRIMINAL

done so, the only verdict and judgement to which it is entitled is guilty of second
degree murder. This result follows because the State ... has conceded the pres-

ence of the mitigating factor ....

).

305. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
defendant's burden to establish mitigation.
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law must recognize that a jury can act in an irrational mannereven to the point of ignoring the law or the Judge's instructions in a
blend of undecipherable mercy,"3 0 6 the law presumes the jury followed the law and the jury's instructions.3 0 7 As one court explained: "We do not demand of the jurors the legal mastery of
Justice Cardozo and the logical consistency of Mr. Spock. We only
want to know what they probably really did, right or wrong." 30 8 If
the defendant is found guilty of second degree murder, the law assumes the jury properly found sufficient mitigation. The parties,
therefore, will not relitigate that issue.
VIII.

THE COMFORTABLE NEW SHOE OF THE "LESSER MITIGATED

OFFENSE": PEOPLE V. NEWBENA

INTRODUCES THE NEW

TERMINOLOGY INTO ILLINOIS' LEGAL

VOCABULARY
Some courts try to force the first and second degree murder
statutes into the "comfortable old shoe" of the lesser included offense analysis "simply because no other recognized description
seems to fit."30 9 One court, however, found a new way to describe
this relationship, and the statutes easily slide into the comfortable,
albeit new, shoe of the lesser mitigated offense characterization.
A.

The Lesser Mitigated Offense

In People v. Newbern, the Fourth District Appellate Court
adopted a new description of the relationship between the first and
second degree murder statutes. 3 10 In rejecting the conclusion that
second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree
murder, the Newbern court found that second degree murder is actually a "lesser mitigated offense" of its first degree sibling. 31 1 The
court first analyzed the lesser included offense doctrine in the context of the first and second degree murder statutes. It concluded
second degree murder cannot be a lesser included offense of first
degree murder because it does not meet either statutory test. Second degree murder does not have the same or fewer elements than
306. Pettaway v. Plummer, 943 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 U.S. 296 (1992).
307. People v. Bernard, 500 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 1886).
308. Butler v. State, 605 A.2d 186, 204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. granted,
612 A.2d 897 (Md. 1992).
309. People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992). See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying
text for a discussion of courts classifying second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree murder.
310. 579 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill.
1992).

311. Id. at 596.
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first degree murder. 3 12 Furthermore, it does not have a less culpa3 13
ble mental state.
However, the court did not end its discussion there. It concluded that "it will not suffice for us to say what that relationship is
not-namely that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder."3 14 The court continued in its effort to
"state what that relationship is, and ... hold that second degree
murder is a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder .... 315
While acknowledging that the concept of the lesser mitigated
offense was new to Illinois law, the Newbern court noted the sui
generis emergence of Illinois' entire second degree murder
scheme. 3 16 The court classified second degree murder as a lesser
crime than first degree murder, noting that its penalties upon conviction are significantly less than the potential punishment a first
degree murder defendant may receive. 3 17 The court explained its
holding that second degree murder was a lesser mitigated offense of
first degree murder, noting that second degree murder is "first degree murder plus defendant's proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor is present."3 1s By definition,
therefore, second degree murder is a mitigated first degree murder.
In coining the phrase "lesser mitigated offense," the court was
simply providing a legal label for the definition provided by the
statute. Second degree murder is clearly a lesser offense than first
degree murder. Indeed, it is the proof of mitigation which makes
second degree murder a lesser offense than first degree murder.
Thus, the Newbern court merely coupled these two aspects of the
statutes and created a label to describe this formula.
Although the concept is new to Illinois law, Illinois did not create the lesser mitigated offense. New York's second degree murder
statute at issue in Patterson v. New York is a type of lesser mitigated offense. 3 19 Montana also codified a type of murder titled the
312. Id.
313. Id.; see 720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (1992). See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for an argument that voluntary manslaughter could not have been a
lesser included offense of murder under the prior statutes. See also supra notes
206-227 and accompanying text which reject the lesser included offense analysis in the context of the first and second degree murder statutes.
314. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 596 (emphasis in original).
315. Id. (emphasis in original).
316. Id.
317. Id. The maximum sentence for first degree murder is death. 720 ILCS
5/9-1 (1992); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1) (1992). Second degree murder, classified as
a Class 1 felony, has a sentencing range of four to fifteen years. 720 ILCS 5/9-1
(1992); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (1992).
318. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 586.
319. See 432 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1977) (finding no due process violation in New
York's murder statute which required the defendant to prove by a preponderance a mitigating factor to reduce a first degree murder charge).
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"mitigated deliberate homicide." 320 A person in Montana commits
a mitigated deliberate homicide when he intentionally causes the
death of another,3 2 1 but does so under the influence of extreme
stress. 3 22 This extreme stress is similar to Illinois' provocation theory of mitigation reducing a first degree murder charge to second
degree murder. 323 Like Illinois' provisions, the Montana statute
requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the requisite mitigation. 32 4 Furthermore, the Montana statute
clearly stipulates that mitigated deliberate homicide is not an included offense of deliberate homicide. 3 25 This is also similar to Illidegree murder
nois, where courts cannot properly consider second326
as a lesser included offense of first degree murder.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (1991). Montana's statute reads:
(1) A person commits the offense of mitigated deliberate homicide
when he purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being
but does so under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for

320.

which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of
such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a

reasonable person in the actor's situation.

(2) It is an affirmative defense that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there was reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the actor's situation. This defense constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing deliberate homicide to mitigated deliberate homicide and must be proved by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.

(3) Mitigated deliberate homicide is not an included offense of deliberate homicide as defined in [Section] 45-5-102(1)(b).
(4) A person convicted of mitigated deliberate homicide shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than 2 years or more than
40 years and may be fined not more than $50,000, except as provided in
[Section] 46-18-222.
Id.

321. These are the same elements of first degree murder in Illinois. See 720

ILCS 5/9-1(a) (1992). See supra note 46 for a discussion of the elements of first

degree murder.
322. MONT. CODE
323.

ANN. § 45-5-103(1) (1991).
See 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1) (1992). See supra note 59 and accompanying

text for a discussion of provocation as a mitigating factor.
324. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103(2) (1991). The Montana Supreme Court
upheld the provision requiring the defendant to prove mitigation and relied
substantially on Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). State v. Knight,
822 P.2d 99, 102 (Mont. 1991). The Court held that the mitigated deliberate
homicide statute "does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to a defendant." Id. at 102. This reasoning resembles Illinois opinions sustaining the
second degree murder statute in the face of similar due process challenges.
E.g., People v. Cook, 576 N.E.2d 1247, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584
N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1991).
325. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103(3) (1991). In dicta, at least one Montana
court inexplicably referred to mitigated deliberate homicide as an included offense of deliberate homicide. Knight, 822 P.2d at 102. This is clearly in direct

contradiction of the language of the statute.

326. See supra notes 207-218 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
inapplicability of the lesser included offense analysis in the first and second
degree murder context.
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The Value of the Lesser Mitigated Offense Characterization

The characterization of second degree murder as a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder clarifies the relationship between the two offenses. While many courts reflexively turn to the
lesser included offense framework simply because of its familiarity,
the lesser mitigated offense description provides both courts and
practitioners with a ready label which accurately describes the relationship between first and second degree murder.
Once courts properly understand that second degree murder is
a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder, the trial and appellate process will operate more efficiently due to the classification's easy application. Trial courts should realize that second
degree murder is simply a first degree murder lessened by appropriate and sufficient mitigation. 3 27 The State must still prove all
the elements of first degree murder in order to receive a conviction
on any murder charge. 3 28 Should the State prove those elements,
the defense can attempt to establish the mitigation necessary to re3 29
ceive a conviction for the lesser offense of second degree murder.
Thus it should be clear that a defendant cannot be found guilty of
second degree murder if the State fails to prove any of the elements
33 0
of first degree murder.
The acceptance of this characterization should also aid in the
appellate analysis and retrial of a second degree murder defendant.
If a defendant is found guilty of second degree murder, the trier of
fact necessarily found the that the defendant satisfactorily established the necessary mitigation to reduce the degree of the homicide. 33 1 As such, the State can no longer litigate the mitigation
issue. 33 2 Should the appellate court reverse the defendant's conviction and remand the case for a new trial, the State may not argue
the absence of mitigation. At retrial, the only appropriate verdicts
would be not guilty or guilty of second degree murder.
By characterizing second degree murder as a lesser mitigated
offense of first degree murder, courts avoid the improper application of the statutes and the misapplication of the lesser included
offense analysis to those statutes. 3 33 Further, because the lesser
mitigated offense structure emphasizes that second degree murder
327.

People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appealde-

nied, 587 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. 1992).

328. Id. at 598.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 597. See supra notes 294-308 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of collateral estoppel at a second degree murder defend-

ant's retrial.
332.
333.

Newbern, 579 N.E.2d at 598.
Id. See supra notes 246-271 and accompanying text for a discussion of

the flawed analysis in People v. Collins, 572 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
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is first degree murder plus mitigation, the new classification highlights the jury's finding of mitigation in the initial trial. It therefore
should be more clear that collateral estoppel operates to preclude
the State from relitigating the mitigation issue at a subsequent new
trial.
IX.

To

BOLDLY

Go

WHERE

No

ONE HAS GONE BEFORE: SHOULD

THE STATE BE PERMITTED TO APPLY ESTOPPEL AGAINST

A DEFENDANT?

One issue the courts have failed to reach is whether the State
can apply collateral estoppel against a defendant. 3 34 This situation
would arise when a defendant faces retrial after his conviction for
first degree murder has been reversed. Could the State then estop
the defense from arguing mitigation and preclude the new jury
from finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder?
At first glance, the theory behind collateral estoppel might appear to support this contention. However, not every first degree
murder trial involves second degree murder issues. Even in a case
which may involve mitigation issues, the defendant has sole discre33 5
tion whether to instruct the jury as to second degree murder.
Hence, the defendant may forego his option to have the instruction
read to the jury as a matter of trial strategy. If he exercises that
option, the jury never considers the mitigation issue. If the jury
does not consider the issue, it is neither actually nor necessarily
resolved at the first trial. Collateral estoppel cannot apply.
Furthermore, courts are extraordinarily hesitant to restrict a
criminal defendant from arguing any theory at trial in his defense. 3 36 By estopping the defendant from arguing mitigation to
the jury, his available defenses may be significantly limited. As
such, without strong legal and policy support, a trial judge would be
hard pressed to find that restricting a defendant in this way would
not be fundamentally unfair.
X.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SELF-DEFENSE AND THE

UNREASONABLE BELIEF REQUIRED FOR
SECOND DEGREE MURDER

The Illinois Supreme Court recently agreed to hear challenges
denied, 580 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 1991), as well as other courts' misapplication of

these statutes.
334.

This would be an offensive application of collateral estoppel. See supra

notes 289-292 and accompanying text for a discussion of offensive and defensive
application of collateral estoppel.

335.

720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992).

336.

See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1208 (3d

ed. 1988) (noting that "[a] fact once determined against a defendant is not binding upon him in a subsequent criminal prosecution").
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to the second degree murder.3 3 7 The defendants challenging the
statute raise several issues, including the constitutionality of the
statutory arrangement and the proper evaluation of the requisite
mental state for first and second degree murder. 338 These defendants also claim that the unreasonable belief in self-defense aspect of
3 39
the second degree murder statute is a nullity.

Unreasonable belief in self-defense typically arises when a first
degree murder defendant claims self-defense and, as is almost always the case, simultaneously argues second degree murder. 340
The present defendants' challenge to the of the statute dissects the
various burdens of proof in a self-defense claim. 34 1 When a murder
defendant claims self-defense, the State must prove more than the
three "regular" elements of first degree murder. The State must
also show that the killing was not carried out in self-defense-that
the claim of self-defense is "not justified." 34 2 A person is justified in
killing another if he reasonably believes the force used was necessary to repel the imminent use of unlawful force.3 4 3 Thus, justification has two distinct aspects: (1) the defendant's actual, subjective
belief in the necessity of the use of deadly force; and (2) the objective reasonableness of that belief. Herein lies the confusion.
Challengers to the statute claim that in arguing second degree
murder, the new law requires defendants to prove that they had an
unreasonable belief in self-defense. 3 44 Such a requirement obviously runs counter to a self-defense claim that they had a reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force. In other words, they
believe the statute forces them to argue that the defendant had
both a reasonable belief (to obtain an acquittal based on self-de337.

People v. Jeffries, pet. for leave to appeal allowed, 616 N.E.2d 341 (Ill.

1993), consolidated on appeal with People v. Newburn, petition for leave to appeal allowed, 619 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 1993).
338. See infra notes 344-346 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

flaws alleged to exist in the statute. See supra notes 213-214 and accompanying text which address the mental state required for murder.
339. Until now, defendants have attacked both the provision concerning unreasonable belief and the rule on provocation.
340. In a murder case where self-defense is at issue, the law may entitle the
defendant to a jury instruction on unreasonable belief second degree murder.

People v. Lockett, 413 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ill. 1980).
341. The issue of self-defense and the reasonableness of the defendants' subjective belief is a question of fact. People v. Savickas, 594 N.E.2d 1233, 1239
(Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 1992); Lockett, 413 N.E.2d at
381-82.
342. E.g., People v. Truss, No. 1-90-1426, 1993 WL 375302 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
343. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (1992); see I.P.I.-CRIMINAL, supra note 51, Nos. 2425.06.
344. See People v. Hooker, 618 N.E.2d 1074, 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating

that "we acknowledge the curiousness of any rule that requires a person to
show that he acted unreasonably").
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fense) and an unreasonable belief (to obtain a second degree murder conviction) in the necessity for the use of force.
They contend that in a self-defense second egree murder case,
the statute requires the defendant to prove that "at the time of the
killing he believe[d] the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing [as self-defense], but his
belief is unreasonable." 3 45 The statute's challengers believe that
the "but his belief is unreasonable" language is a part of the requisite mitigation, and the defendant therefore carries the burden of
proving it.

This simply is not so. A careful reading of the statute demonstrates that the defendant must prove only that he had an actual
belief in the necessity of self-defense irrespectiveof the objective reasonableness of that belief. The statutory reference to the unreasonable belief merely refers to the issues accompanying self-defense. It
is not part of what the defendant has to prove in order to establish
mitigation. Thus, defendants do not (and obviously should not) argue the objective unreasonableness of that belief.346 Instead, to re-

duce a finding of first degree murder to second degree murder, it is
the defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
only that the defendant had an actual belief in the necessity for
self-defense
independent of the objective reasonableness of the
7
34

belief.

Defendants further argue that for the State to defeat a claim of
self-defense, in arguing the justification issue, it must first attempt
to disprove the defendant's actual, subjective belief. If the State
succeeds, the defendant is guilty of first degree murder. 3 48 If the
State fails, the trier of fact must then consider whether the defendant's belief was objectively reasonable. If it was objectively reasonable, the defendant successfully asserted self-defense and is not
guilty of either first degree or second degree murder. If there is no
finding of objective reasonableness, the trier of fact must find the
defendant guilty of second degree murder.
In organizing the logical process in this manner, the defendant
merges the trier of fact's consideration of self-defense and second
degree murder claims. This shifts the burden of proving his subjective belief from his shoulders to those of the State. This argument
places the burden of proof in precisely the same place it was under
the old voluntary manslaughter statute. Under the old law, the
345. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c) (1992).
346. See People v. Sims, 617 N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding
that "the defense had the burden of proving that the defendant believed he was
acting in self-defense " ) (emphasis in original).
347. Id.
348. Of course, the State must also prove the three "regular" elements of
murder.
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State had the burden to disprove the defendant's subjective belief
beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the defendant's paradigm, the
State must again attempt to disprove it during the trier of fact's
consideration of self-defense and second degree murder.
Courts should reject this erroneous application of the murder
statutes with the following evaluation. Once the State establishes
the three "regular" elements of first degree murder, the trier of fact
must address the justification issue. 34 9 In order to instruct the jury
on self-defense, the defendant must establish some evidence of each
of the following: (1) the decedent threatened him with force; (2) the
defendant was not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm was imminent; (4) the threatened force was unlawful; (5) he actually and subjectively believed a danger existed which required the use of the
35 0
force applied; and (6) his beliefs were objectively reasonable.
If the State negates any one of the self-defense elements, the
defendant loses on his claim of self-defense. 3 51 Although it may
wish to attack the defendant's claimed subjective belief, the State
should logically be free to argue whichever element it chooses to
dispute. The defendant's unreasonable belief is not an element the
State must disprove in defeating a claim of self-defense.3 52 This is
only one of the six factors which the State may rebut to overcome a
claim of self-defense. The State may just as easily defeat a selfdefense claim by proving the absence of any threat of force against
the defendant, that the defendant was the aggressor, the absence of
a danger of imminent harm, or a lack of unlawful force. 35 3 When
the State disputes one of the elements of self-defense, it does not
concede the existence of any of the others, including whether the
defendant had a subjective belief in self-defense.
If the trier of fact determines that the State has disproved one
of the elements, it must find the defendant guilty of either first or
second degree murder. The second degree murder statute clearly
dictates the proper analysis. After finding the three "regular" elements of first degree murder and the lack of justification, the trier
of fact must determine whether the defendant subjectively believed
349. There is no magical order in which to apply these elements. The Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions sequentially list the elements as propositions with
justification following the establishment of three "regular" elements of first de-

gree murder. IPI - CRiMINAL (1992), supra note 51, No. 7.06A. As such, the
instructions do not bifurcate proof of first degree murder from the justification.
Id.
350. People v. Chavez, 592 N.E.2d 69, 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
351. Id.
352. People v. Bosek, 569 N.E.2d 551, 566 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580
N.E.2d 121 (Ill. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1180 (1992).
353. E.g., People v. Purdle, 571 N.E.2d 178, 181 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that
"the State met its burden of proving that [the] defendant was not legally justified in killing [the victim]... [tihere was ample testimony that [the] defendant
was the aggressor ....
), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 129 (Ill. 1991).
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he was acting in self-defense. Because self-defense is rejected on
other grounds, the defendant must still establish his subjective
belief.
The burden of proof on this issue rests squarely on the defendant. The preponderance of the evidence must show that the defendant subjectively believed he needed to use deadly force.3 5 4 If the
trier of fact finds the evidence rises to the level of a preponderance,
the defendant is guilty of second degree murder. If the opposite is
true, the defendant is guilty of first degree murder.
Thus, defendants should argue the obvious-that they killed in
self-defense and, in the alternative, that the killing was a second
degree murder rather than a first degree murder. In other words,
the defendant should first claim he had an actual belief in self-defense and that it was objectively reasonable. As a fallback position,
the defendant should claim he still had the subjective belief, regardless of its objective reasonableness.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Courts innately feel that a defendant whose second degree
murder conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial should
not be subject to a conviction for first degree murder at retrial.
Under the old voluntary manslaughter/murder statutes, voluntary
manslaughter was generally found to be a lesser included offense of
murder. Hence, such a retrial for murder clearly violated double
jeopardy. The new law of second degree murder, however, is not
lesser included in first degree murder. Thus, double jeopardy cannot apply.
Instead, principles of collateral estoppel effectively prevent a
retrial for first degree murder where the defendant was initially
convicted of second degree murder. At the initial trial, the trier of
fact necessarily found the defendant established one of the mitigating factors in order to find him guilty of second degree murder. Due
to collateral estoppel, the State may not subsequently relitigate
mitigation issues. Thus, the defendant is in exactly the same position as if the State simply charged him with second degree murder:
the prosecution must prove all the elements of first degree murder,
but the presence of mitigation is not at issue. As such, the jury
may either acquit or convict the defendant of second degree murder.
The recent characterization of second degree murder as a lesser
mitigated offense of first degree murder perfectly tracks the language and intent of the statutes. Second degree murder is first degree murder plus mitigation. It is, by definition, a mitigated (and
therefore lesser offense than) first degree murder. This description
354.
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also serves to highlight the applicability of collateral estoppel in a
retrial situation.
The characterization of second degree murder as a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder, coupled with the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, is fully consistent with the plain language of Illinois' murder statutes, their legislative history and relevant constitutional precedents. Although the concepts of double jeopardy do
not apply in the context of these rather unique statutes, collateral
estoppel assures the full protection of defendants' rights. Finally,
the correct use of these doctrines will bring the courts to the same
just conclusion as reached through a more tortuous analysis.
The first and second degree murder statutes resolve much of
the confusion that reigned during the tenure of the murder/voluntary manslaughter era. The lesser mitigated offense characterization clarifies the relationship between the two offenses, and
provides clear guidance in applying the law.

